Parens Patriae Antitrust Suits by Foreign Nations by Caplan, Russell L.
Denver Journal of International Law & Policy 
Volume 6 
Number 2 Spring Article 8 
May 2020 
Parens Patriae Antitrust Suits by Foreign Nations 
Russell L. Caplan 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/djilp 
Recommended Citation 
Russell L. Caplan, Parens Patriae Antitrust Suits by Foreign Nations, 6 Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 705 (1977). 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Denver Sturm College of Law at 
Digital Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Denver Journal of International Law & Policy by an 
authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-
commons@du.edu. 
STUDENT COMMENTS




Three consolidated cases, Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, ' Pfizer, Inc.
v. Republic of Vietnam,2 and Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of
India,3 are among the first cases in which foreign governments
have sought antitrust relief in the United States.' The India
case in particular represents the first parens patriae suit
brought by a recognized foreign government in the United
States.- Although the parens patriae suit for treble damages
* A.B., 1972, Dartmouth College; B.A., 1974, Oxford University; J.D. candidate,
Yale Law School. The author is indebted to Professor Michael Reisman of the Yale
Law School for thoughtful criticism of earlier drafts of this article.
1. 522 F.2d 612 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 950 (1976).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 315 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). See Note,
Antitrust-Standing-Foreign Nation Has Standing to Sue for Treble Damages, 5 VAND.
J. TRANS. L. 531 (1972); Note, The Capacity of Foreign Sovereigns to Maintain Private
Federal Antitrust Actions, 9 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 137 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Foreign Sovereigns]; Note, The Capacity of a Foreign Government to Bring an Action
for Treble Damages Under the Federal Antitrust Laws, 44 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 287
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Foreign Government Antitrust Capacity].
India and Israel previously sought antitrust relief as part of the Electrical Equip-
ment Co. cases over a decade ago, but since neither suit reached the stage of decision
on the merits, neither case has precedential value. When Foreign Nations Sue Under
Antitrust, Bus. WEEK, Feb. 24, 1975, at 26; In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F.
Supp. 315, 316 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
5. In addition to India and Vietnam, governments involved in this appeal are Iran
and the Philippines. Other governments filed similar suits after the commencement
of the litigation and are not included in the instant cases. Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 522 F.2d
at 613 n.1. The Vietnam case is complicated by the fact that the United States no
longer recognizes the government of Vietnam. "The rule is that unrecognized govern-
ments may not maintain suits in state or federal courts." Id., n.3. See Guaranty Trust
Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 136-41 (1938); Federal Republic of Germany v.
Elicofon, 358 F. Supp. 747 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd, 478 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 931 (1974); accord, Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S.
398, 408-12 (1964). Thus, although Vietnam was technically the first government to
file an amended complaint as parens patriae (Mar. 26, 1974), India's complaint (Oct.
11, 1974) represents the first parens patriae suit brought by a recognized foreign gov-
ernment and, hence, the first suit with a claim to formal validity.
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has received little attention in the past,' it has recently been
the subject of Congressional inquiry culminating in its inclu-
sion in the Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976.1 In the interna-
tional context the parens patriae suit is of major significance.
When combined with a treble damages recovery, parens
patriae can serve as an instrument of economic redistribution
to underdeveloped nations.
The South Vietnam case was dismissed by the district court after receipt of advice
that the United States no longer recognized any government as sovereign in the former
territory of that republic. Republic of Vietnam v. Pfizer Inc., No. 4-71 Civ. 402 (D.
Minn. Dec. 2, 1976), afJ'd, No. 77-1093 (8th Cir. June 15, 1977).
6. As distinct from the variety of parens patriae which involves minors, the in-
sane, and other legally incompetent persons, the type of parens patriae in which the
state acts on a broader political scale is specifically discussed by only a very few
published works. See Alioto, Toward a More Effective Enforcement of the Antitrust
Laws: Suits by the State as Parens Patriae, 1969 BEVERLY HILLS B.J. 12 (1969); Malina
& Blechman, Parens Patriae Suits for Treble Damages Under the Antitrust Laws, 65
Nw. U.L. REV. 193 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Malina & Blechman]; Comment, State
Protection of its Economy and Environment: Parens Patriae Suits for Damages, 6
COLUM. J.L. & SOCIAL PROBLEMS 411 (1970) [hereinafter cited as State Protection];
Note, Wrongs Without Remedy: The Concept of Parens Patriae Suits for Treble Dam-
ages Under the Antitrust Laws, 43 S. CAL. L. REV. 570 (1970). See also Georgia v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439, 468-90 (1945) (dissenting opinion of Stone, C.J.); M.
FORKOSCH, ANTITRUST AND THE CONSUMER 311-34 (1956); Handler & Blechman,
Antitrust and the Consumer Interest: The Fallacy of Parens Patriae and a Suggested
New Approach, 85 YALE L.J. 626 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Handler & Blechman].
The best recent discussion of the general concept of parens patriae-the Latin refers
to the sovereign's role as "parent of the country"-is in Comment, State Standing to
Challenge Federal Administrative Action: A Re-Examination of the Parens Patriae
Doctrine, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1069 (1977). See also Note, The Proposed Antitrust Parens
Patriae Act: Overdue Antitrust Relief for Ultimate Consumers, 45 U. CIN. L. REv. 219
(1976).
7. Hearings on H.R. 12528 and H.R. 12921 Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies
and Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1974); Hearings on H.R. 38 and H.R. 2850 Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and
Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Hearings on H.R. 38 and H.R. 2850]; Hearings on S. 1284 Before
the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). See also AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, ANTITRUST PARENS
PATRIAE BILL: CONSUMER DAMAGE SUITS BY STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL (1975)
[hereinafter cited as PARENS PATRIAE BILL]. For favorable editorial comment on the
proposed legislation, see Washington Post, Feb. 29, 1976, at G6, cols. 1-2. For a more
reserved endorsement, see N.Y. Times, June 17, 1976, at 34, col. 2. The bill became
law as the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435,
90 Stat. 1383 (1976). Title I, governing parens patriae actions by state attorneys
general, constitutes additions immediately following and amending Clayton Act § 4B,
15 U.S.C. § 15B (1970). The practical effect of the bill may have been severely limited,
however, by the recent Supreme Court decision, Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 45
U.S.L.W. 4611 (U.S. June 9, 1977).
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The potential impact of this redistributive function there-
fore requires a close examination of both parens patriae and the
damages recoverable thereunder. After briefly surveying the
history of the antibiotics litigation, this article will examine the
history and doctrine of parens patriae and employ some of the
conclusions reached therein to help answer questions concern-
ing India's capacity to sue under American antitrust law, its
preferable litigation posture in the instant case, and its re-
coverable damages. The article concludes that since India
does have capacity to sue, it has a choice from among parens
patriae, class action, or a suit on its own behalf in its proprie-
tary capacity, and that parens patriae is the most effective
strategy. Recovery is to be limited to actual damages, prefera-
bly to be realized through reduced prices on goods or services
sold in the future.
II. BACKGROUND OF THE ANTIBIOTICS LITIGATION
The suit by India' stems from a group of over 150 civil and
criminal antitrust suits,9 now mostly settled, against Pfizer,
Inc., and four other drug companies'0 for violations of the Sher-
man Antitrust Act" and related regulations. The actions grow
out of proceedings brought by the Federal Trade Commission
beginning in 1958 2 and criminal antitrust proceedings starting
8. Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 522 F.2d 612 (8th Cir. 1975). For a general history of the
antibiotics litigation through May 1975, see Wolfram, The Antibiotics Class Actions,
1976 A.B.F. REs. J. 251; for journalistic commentary, see von Hoffman, Operation
Moneyback: Of Price Fixing and Antibiotics, Washington Post, May 10, 1976, at Cl,
col. 1.
9. See also Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d 532 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 976
(1972); United States v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 426 F.2d 32 (2d Cir. 1970); Chas. Pfizer &
Co. v. FTC, 401 F.2d 574 (6th Cir. 1968); American Cyanamid Co. v. FTC, 363 F.2d
757 (6th Cir. 1966); West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 314 F. Supp. 710 (S.D.N.Y.
1970), aff'd 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971); In re Antibiotic
Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 315 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); In re Antibiotic Drugs, 320 F.
Supp. 586 (J.P.M.L. 1970); In re Antibiotic Drug Litigation, 309 F. Supp. 155
.(J.P.M.L. 1970), 303 F. Supp. 1056 (J.P.M.L. 1969), 301 F. Supp. 1158 (J.P.M.L.
1969), 299 F. Supp. 1403 (J.P.M.L. 1969), 295 F. Supp. 1402 (J.P.M.L. 1968); Ameri-
can Cyanamid Co., 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 16,527 (FTC 1963), final order entered,
id. at 16,699 (FTC 1963). For a discussion of the last case, see Note, Improperly
Procured Patents: FTC Jurisdiction and Remedial Power, 77 HARv. L. REV. 1505 (1964)
[hereinafter cited as Patents].
10. American Cyanamid Co., Bristol-Myers Co., Squibb Corp., and the Upjohn
Co. Olin Corp., formerly Squibb's parent company, however, appears as a defendant
in the present litigation.
11. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1970).
12. In re American Cyanamid Co., Civ. No. 7211 (July 28, 1958), order vacated
1977
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in 1961.' 3 The indictments charged: (1) combination and con-
spiracy in restraint of trade and (2) actual monopolization."
Pfizer claimed the discovery in June 1952 of tetracycline,
a broad spectrum antibiotic, generally regarded as greatly su-
perior to any of the other "wonder drugs" then on the market,
such as chlortetracycline, chloramphenicol, or oxytetracyc-
line.' 5 In October, Pfizer applied for a patent. Early in 1953,
Cyanamid also claimed discovery of tetracycline and applied
for a patent. In succeeding months, Bristol-Myers and other
companies filed patents for tetracycline based on a different
manufacturing process. It was then determined that for Pfizer
to produce tetracycline commercially processes patented by
Cyanamid had to be used.'6
At two meetings between Pfizer and Cyanamid held in
November 1953, it was agreed that Cyanamid would license
Pfizer under the patents Cyanamid held and that proofs of
priority on tetracycline would be exchanged. The party found
not to have priority on tetracycline would yield its claim to the
other; the company granted the tetracycline patent would then
and remanded, 363 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1966), order after remand aff'd sub. nom. Chas.
Pfizer & Co. v. FTC, 401 F.2d 574 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 920 (1969).
13. United States v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 61 Cr. 772 (indictment returned Aug. 17,
1961), rev'd for new trial, 426 F.2d 32 (2d Cir. 1970), prior en banc hearing order
vacated, opinion of panel modified, and petition for rehearing denied, 437 F.2d 957 (2d
Cir. 1970), new trial determination aff'd by an equally divided court, 404 U.S. 548
(1972), on remand, 367 F. Supp. 91 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); see also North Carolina v. Chas.
Pfizer & Co., 384 F. Supp. 265 (E.D.N.C. 1974), afJ'd 1975-2 Trade Cas. 60,663 (4th
Cir. 1976).
14. See United States v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 426 F.2d 32 (2d Cir. 1970). In sub-
stance the alleged conspiratorial agreements were that: (a) the manufacture of tetra-
cycline be confined to Pfizer, Cyanamid, and Bristol; (b) the sale of tetracycline
products be confined to Pfizer, Cyanamid, Bristol, Upjohn, and Squibb; (c) the sale
of bulk tetracycline be confined to Bristol and bulk tetracycline be sold by Bristol only
to Upjohn and Squibb; and (d) the sale of broad spectrum antibiotic products by the
defendant companies and the coconspirator companies be at substantially identical
and noncompetitive prices. Id. at 33.
15. Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d 532, 534 (8th Cir. 1972); United States v. Chas.
Pfizer & Co., 426 F.2d 32, 35 (2d Cir. 1970). For further analysis of the early historical
background with special attention paid to the scientific and technical aspects of the
case, see West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 314 F. Supp. 710 (S.D.N.Y. 1970);
American Cyanamid Co. v. FTC, 363 F.2d 757, 773-74 (6th Cir. 1966); Patents, supra
note 9.
16. The Duggar and Niedercorn patents for the mold fermentation process. West




license the other. When the proofs were made, Cyanamid
yielded to Pfizer, and Pfizer was issued a patent for tetracyc-
line in January 1955.18 Later in the year Pfizer granted licenses
under its patent to Bristol-Myers, Squibb, and Upjohn. 9
From 1951 to 1958 the Federal Trade Commission con-
ducted an investigation of the pricing policies of Pfizer and the
other drug companies. The FTC alleged that Pfizer had ob-
tained its tetracycline patent by conspiracy and fraud, that all
of the participating drug companies had withheld relevant in-
formation from the Patent Office, and that they were guilty of
monopolistic practices in the production and sale of antibiotic
drugs.20 The bulk of the litigation was over by 1969, ending
inconclusively with respect to findings of illegal activity.2'
The actions by India, Vietnam, and the other foreign gov-
ernments involved are among the less than 30 remaining anti-
biotic actions still pending.22 In the present Pfizer litigation,
the foreign governments prosecuted claims against the drug
companies based on three theories of recovery: (1) as sovereigns
with proprietary interests with regard to their own purchases;
(2) as parens patriae or "official representative" with respect
to the foreign nationals, institutions, and corporations who
purchased the drugs; and (3) as representatives of the class of
17. "If a patent on [Pfizer's tetracycline] invention were issued to Pfizer, then
neither Cyanamid nor Pfizer could make tetracycline except by agreement between
them. Each would be blocked by a patent of the other." Id.
18. Pfizer Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d at 534-35; United States v. Chas. Pfizer & Co.,
426 F.2d at 35-36; West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 314 F. Supp. at 714. During
this time Bristol had begun to manufacture and market tetracycline, selling it in bulk
to Squibb and Upjohn. Cyanamid brought suit against Bristol in September 1954,
claiming infringement of its fermentation patents. The matter was settled when Cy-
anamid agreed to license Bristol, as well as Squibb and Upjohn, for the use of its
Duggar and Niedercorn processes. Pfizer Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d at 535; West Virginia
v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 314 F. Supp. at 714.
19. West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 314 F. Supp. at 714.
20. Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d at 535.
21. There was, however, a finding of misconduct as to Pfizer and Cyanamid before
the Patent Office. Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d at 535; West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer
& Co., 314 F. Supp. at 715-18. At one point the government pleaded that "in those
seven years [November 1953-September 1961, the alleged conspiratorial period] Bris-
tol made approximately $57 million in profits [$69 million minus production costs of
$12 million] . . . . In 1954 [100 tetracycline capsules] cost Cyanamid $2.26, in 1955
it cost them $1.57. That listed [retail to the consumer] for $51. The druggist paid
$30.60 - 2,000% mark-up." United States v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 426 F.2d at 38.
22. See Joint Brief for Petitioners-Appellants at 6; Joint Brief for Respondents at
3; Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 522 F.2d 612 (8th Cir. 1975).
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all their citizens who have treble damage claims against the
companies.23 Defendant companies sought reversal of the dis-
trict court's interlocutory rulings24 that (1) foreign governments
are "persons" entitled to sue for teble damages under the anti-
trust laws and (2) that foreign governments can sue to collect
the damage awards of their citizens as parens patriae without
meeting the requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure regulating the conduct of class action suits.2 5
The question whether foreign governments have capacity
to sue under our antitrust laws was originally left undecided by
the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.26 The issue had
been presented to the Eighth Circuit on a writ of mandamus,
since the district court had declined to certify the question for
interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) 7.2 Holding that
mandamus was appropriate for review only when abuse of judi-
cial discretion so warranted, 2 the court ruled that mandamus
would not lie merely to challenge the decision of a court when
the question was in its jurisdiction.29 Thus the court did not
reach the merits of the question, "since in our view mandamus
does not lie to review this ruling of the district court."30
On the subject of parens patriae, the circuit court held
that "[tihe plaintiff governments assert no quasi-sovereign
interest, their only interest is proprietary in nature."' 3' "We
reverse [the district court], and hold that the plaintiff govern-
ments may not sue on behalf of their citizens' antitrust damage
claims as parens patriae. ,32 Following the reasoning of the Su-
preme Court in Hawaii v. Standard Oil of California,33 the
court held that such injuries to the state as now contested
23. Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 522 F.2d 612, 614 (8th Cir. 1975).
24. The orders were not reported, but are reproduced in part in the briefs of the
foreign governments, passim.
25. Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 522 F.2d at 614.
26. The district court held in the affirmative. 522 F.2d at 614, 617 n.8, comment
in 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 437 (1976).
27. 522 F.2d at 614.
28. Id.
29. Id. "Even if [the court's] decision were erroneous (and we intimate no view
on the merits), under the circumstances of this case it would not constitute a clear
abuse of discretion." Id. at 615.
30. Id. at 614.
31. Id. at 617.
32. Id. at 616.
33. 405 U.S. 251 (1972).
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(denominated "injuries to the general economy") were not sus-
ceptible of measurement, being rather the sum total of injuries
to individuals;34 thus a class action and not a parens patriae
suit was the correct approach. 5 To the foreign governments'
argument that such a class action would be financially impossi-
ble in the wake of the notice requirements set out in Eisen v.
Carlisle & Jacquelin,3" the court's response was simply:
While there are no reported decisions on the right of a foreign
government to prosecute such an action, in several recent instan-
ces domestic state governments have attempted to do so. So far
none has been permitted to recover on that theory, and the Su-
preme Court has expressed a strong preference for class actions
instead .
In the most recent major development," the Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit on interlocutory appeal affirmed the
holding of the District Court for the District of Minnesota, that
foreign governments are "persons" entitled to sue for treble
damages under section 4 of the Clayton Act. 9
The Supreme Court has yet to pass definitively on the
legal status of foreign countries under American antitrust
laws,4 but even if foreign countries are granted capacity to sue,
as case law now stands, they could only bring class action suits
or suits in their proprietary capacity. But analysis of the princi-
ples involved in parens patriae doctrine suggests that a parens
34. But see text accompanying notes 200-15, infra.
35. Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 522 F.2d at 617. "A parens patriae action cannot be
brought to collect the damage claim of one legally entitled to sue in his own right....
In our view, plaintiffs may represent their citizens' damage claims only if they can do
so within a Rule 23 class action." Id. at 616.
36. 417 U.S. 156 (1974). "[The foreign governments] ask that we expand the
concept of parens patriae to permit them to sue on behalf of persons legally entitled
to sue on their own behalf, but as a practical matter generally unable to do so." Pfizer,
Inc. v. Lord, 522 F.2d at 617.
37. 522 F.2d at 617.
38. Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 1976-1 Trade Cas. 60,892 (8th Cir., May
19, 1976), aff'd en banc 1976-2 Trade Cas. 61,175 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 45
U.S.L.W. 3690 (U.S. Apr. 18, 1977) (No. 76-749).
39. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970). The court also remanded to the district court the
question of the viability of Vietnam's suit.
40. This may be an issue of increasing importance; in addition to the governments
already mentioned, West Germany, Spain, Colombia, and South Korea have begun
or have been involved in suits against Pfizer and the other drug companies. Kuwait's
suit ended in a settlement and dismissal without prejudice. BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE
REG. REP., No. 697, A-23 (Jan. 21, 1975). The suits by South Korea and Spain have
also been withdrawn.
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patriae suit is the best solution in such circumstances and
should be seriously considered despite the Supreme Court's
denial of certiorari on that question."
III. THE THEORY OF PARENS PATRIAE
A. English Origins
The power of parens patriae reflects the tension between
the two contradictory attributes traditionally ascribed to sover-
eign dignity-unfettered liberty and the duty to maintain the
general welfare. In modern terms, the uncertainty lies in
whether parens patriae actions involve right or only privilege.
Blackstone, writing in the latter half of the eighteenth cen-
tury,42 defines the scope of parens patriae actions by saying
that the sovereign is "the general guardian of all infants, idiots
and lunatics"4 and "has the general superintendence of all
charitable uses in the kingdom."44 The single purpose underly-
41. 424 U.S. 950 (1976). The fact that the parens patriae question has been consid-
ered apart from foreign governments' legal status as a whole indicates fundamental
confusion as to what is meant by capacity and what is meant by standing to sue.
Capacity refers to the right of access to a court generally, the option of presenting a
claim for adjudication should the occasion arise. Capacity to sue is an entitlement
which may be granted or revoked on various prudential or political grounds whose
bases have nothing to do with the criteria for proving standing. Mental incompetents
and unrecognized foreign governments, for instance, lack the legal capacity to sue in
United States courts, although, since mental incompetents have cognizable rights,
alternative methods have been devised by which parties possessing capacity may sue
on their behalf. See note 5, supra; text accompanying notes 45, 79-90, infra.
Standing, by contrast, is less concerned with the identity of the parties than it is
with the nature of the alleged offense. Standing therefore assumes capacity and refers
to the determination of whether the actual injury complained of is contemplated by
the statute or whether the litigating party has a sufficient interest in or nexus to the
outcome of the case. Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397
U.S. 150, 153-54 (1970); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 98-103 (1968); Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186, 204 (1962); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 152
(1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Thus the central tlesis of this essay is that when
a parens patriae suit represents the only means of fulfilling the requirements of stand-
ing and practicality, especially when capacity has been specifically granted by treaty
(see note 205 infra), denial of the parens patriae claim forecloses all possiblity of
obtaining relief, and renders "capacity" an empty concept. If an entity such as a
foreign nation legally has access to the courts, then to cut off all avenues of access is
flatly inconsistent.
42. Blackstone began his law lectures at Oxford University in 1753. These lectures
formed the basis of the COMMENTARIES, published in 1765-69. Holdsworth, Some As-
pects of Blackstone and His Commentaries, 4 CAMB. L.J. 261, 262, 268 (1932).
43. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 47 (T. Cooley ed. 1872) [hereinafter cited
as BLACKSTONE]. See Malina & Blechman, supra note 6, at 197.
44. 2 BLACKSTONE at 47. The conflation of the power over charitable uses and
power over lunatics, idiots, and other legal incompetents under parens patriae as
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ing the combining of these two powers under the parens patriae
doctrine would seem to be that of helping those who are legally
(and in some cases actually) incompetent to help themselves.
[Tihe authority [over charitable uses] thus exercised ar-
ises, in part, from the ordinary power of the court of chancery
over trusts, and, in part, from the right of the government, or
sovereign, as parens patriae, to supervise the acts of public and
charitable institutions in the interests of those to be benefited by
their establishment; and, if their funds become bona vacantia, or
left without lawful charge, or appropriated to illegal purposes, to
cause them to be applied in such lawful manner as justice and
equity may require."
Blackstone is inconsistent as to whether the exercise of the
parens patriae power is discretionary or required by duty. On
the one hand,
as to private injuries: if any person has, in point of property, a
just demand upon the king, he must petition him in his court of
chancery, where his chancellor will administer right as a matter
of grace though not upon compulsion."
exercised by the chancellor was well established by Blackstone's time. 1 W. HOLD-
SWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 474 (1938) [hereinafter cited as HOLDSWORTH].
Originally, however, "[lj]urisdiction over those of unsound mind . . . was vested in
the Exchequer." Id. By the time of Elizabeth the chancellor had already assumed
jurisdiction to enforce a charitable legacy by the statutes of charitable uses. See 39
Eliz. I. c. 6 (1597); 43 Eliz. I. c. 4 (1601); G. JONES, HISTORY OF THE LAW OF CHARITY
1532-1827, at 18 (1969).
45. Mormon Church v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 56 (1890).
The common thread that runs through the history of the parens patriae
concept is the belief that where citizens have been injured, but are not
capable of obtaining relief for themselves, the State should act on their
behalf.
Originally,- the parens patriae concept was employed on behalf of
persons unable to protect their own interests because of mental incapac-
ity; today, we use the doctrine to protect those who, although injured, are
unable to seek relief because of lack of legal standing or adequate finan-
cial resources.
Hearings on H.R. 38 and H.R. 2850, supra note 7, at 21 (statement of James T.
Halverson).
46. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 43, at 241 (emphasis added). On the perquisites of
sovereignty, Blackstone writes:
And, first, the law ascribes to the king the attribute of sovereignty, or pre-
eminence. . . His realm is declared to be an empire, . . . by many acts
of parliament, . . . which at the same time declare the king to be the
supreme head of the realm in matters both civil and ecclesiastical, and
of consequence inferior to no man upon earth, dependent on no man,
accountable to no man. . . .[Tihe person of the king is sacred, even
though the measures -pursued in his reign be completely tyrannical and
arbitrary.
1977
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On the other hand,
[t]he principal duty of the king is, to govern his people accord-
ing to law. . . . "The king," saith Bracton, . . . "ought not to
be subject to man, but to God, and to the law; for the law maketh
the king. . . . [H]e is not truly king, where will and pleasure
rules, and not the law."4
The "duties" that a monarch "owes" his people are expressed
in the coronation oath: "to govern according to law; to execute
judgment in mercy; and to maintain the established religion."4
A soverign subject to law in matters pertaining to the dispens-
ing of justice is in fact the crucial element of a constitutional,
as opposed to an absolute, monarchy,49 but this concept of
sovereignty is incompatible with purely discretionary exercise
of the parens patriae power.5 0
The traditions which ultimately came to be embodied in
the doctrine of parens patriae arose from political controversies
in which the legal principles were directly and deeply rooted.5 '
Blackstone, less an original theorist than a codifier of the law,
was profoundly influenced by these controversies.52 Hobbes, for
instance, whose treatise on government, Leviathan, appeared
in 1651, had argued that men organize, or can justify their
organizing, into political units out of inherent weakness:53 with-
out strong central authority civilization would be internecine
struggle,54 "and the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish,
Id. See also Malina & Blechman, supra note 6, at 198.
47. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 43, at 233-34. Bracton died in 1268.
48. Id. at 235.
49. Id. at 233, 234.
50. "Discretion" implies a choice on the part of the chancellor to recognize the
power of parens patriae or not, as he sees fit. But "law implies governance through a
system of rules that are generally applicable." 0. Fiss, INJUNCTIONS 74 (1972). See also
K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE (1969); Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Con-
stitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1, 9-10 (1959).
51. "The contest between King and Parliament for predominance in the state
occupies the greater part of this [seventeenth] century; and the victory of the Parlia-
ment resulted in the settlement of the law of the constitution upon its modern basis."
6 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 44, at 3.
52. Blackstone's debt (and hence that of subsequent Anglo-American jurisprud-
ence) to preceding political theorists, especially Hobbes and Locke, as well as to pre-
ceding legal scholars, is manifest throughout the CoMMENTARIES. See 6 HOLDSWORTH,
supra note 44, at 273-301 (The Influence of Political Theories on the Development of
English Public Law).
53. T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 40-41 (C. Macpherson ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as
LEVIATHAN].
54. Id. at 41.
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and short."5 Out of aversion to death and social chaos and
desire to enjoy the amenities of civilization,56 men contract
with a sovereign who is invested with absolute power to look
after their interests." The absoluteness of the sovereign Hobbes
sees as the lesser of two evils, the greater evil being civil war,58
the closest historical approximation to the hypothetical state
of nature.58 The function of the sovereign, Hobbes says, is "the
procuration of the safety of the people. . . . But by Safety here,
is not meant a bare preservation, but also all other Content-
ments of life . . ,,.0 Thus the sovereign comes into being
expressly for the benefit of the subjects, including those for
some reason unable to cope for themselves:
And whereas many men, by accident inevitable, become unable
to maintain themselves by their labour; they ought not to be left
to the charity of private persons; but to be provided for (as far-
forth as the necessities of Nature require) by the laws of the
Commonwealth. For as it is uncharitableness in any man, to
neglect the impotent; so it is in the sovereign of a commonwealth,
to expose them to the hazard of such uncertain charity."
As early as Hobbes, then, the care of the weaker or otherwise
less capable members of society was entrusted to the sovereign
less as a matter of the sovereign's "grace" than as a condition
of contract.
Locke followed Hobbes in all the essentials, except that
where Hobbes made the contract binding in perpetuity, Locke
made it revocable by the consent of the people.62 The increased
cohesiveness and stability of the middle class made political
disintegration upon termination of the social contract 3 less
likely, so that the bargaining power between sovereign and
55. Id. at 186.
56. Id. at 41, 223.
57. Id. at 41, 232, 260-61. The state is simply "organised force," L. STEPHEN,
HOBBES 211, quoted in 6 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 44, at 298.
58. LEVIATHAN, supra note 53, at 47, 233.
59. Id. at 41, 224.
60. Id. at 376 (emphasis in original). See also id. at 48, 385.
61. Id. at 387.
62. In his SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT, published in 1690, Locke sought to
justify the Glorious Revolution of 1688, "to establish the throne of our great Restorer,
our present King William, and make good his title in the consent of the people." J.
LoCKE, Two TREATISES OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT vii (W. Carpenter ed. 1940) [hereinafter
cited as LOCKE].
63. See LEVIATHAN, supra note 53, at 55, 58.
1977
716 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY
subjects shifted to the latter. 4 Locke was thus able to confirm
the notion that power "shall be made use of for the good of the
nation." 5 For Locke, as for Hobbes, the safety and general
welfare of the people was the government's paramount con-
cern." Since the purpose of political organization was to avoid
the confusion and inconvenience of each citizen's taking the
law into his own hands, 7 and to preserve one's possessions, 8 a
government which failed to achieve these ends ceased to have
a reason for existence.
It was Locke's analysis of the function of sovereignty that
Blackstone followed more closely. For the jurist, as for Hobbes
and Locke, government has its origins in men's perception of
their individual weakness. "The only true and natural founda-
tions of society are the wants and fears of individuals." 9 The
contract between the governed and the government is not
rooted in any particular historical event, but rather is the theo-
retical justification for obedience to the king and the king's
duty to serve his subjects. 0 The king's gross abuse of power
constitutes breach of contract on his part, and the arrangement
may therefore be dissolved.7
Locke's analysis of political incompetency similarly fore-
shadows Blackstone's discussion of legal incompetency. Locke
states that a child "is in an estate wherein he has no under-
64. "For all power given with trust for the attaining an end being limited by that
end, whenever that end is manifestly neglected or opposed, the trust must necessarily
be forfeited, and the power devolve into the hands of those that gave it, who may place
it anew where they shall think best for their safety and security." LOCKE, supra note
62, at 192.
65. Id. at 202.
66. "Salus populi suprema lex [the welfare of the people is the supreme law] is
certainly so just and fundamental a rule, that he who sincerely follows it cannot
dangerously err." Id. at 197.
67. Id. at 181-82.
68. Id. at 180.
69. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 43, at 46.
70. Id. at 47.
71. "Indeed, . . . whenever the unconstitutional oppressions, even of the sover-
eign power, advance with gigantic strides, and threaten desolation to a state, mankind
will not be reasoned out of the feelings of humanity; nor will sacrifice their liberty
... .When King James the Second invaded the fundamental constitution of the
realm, the convention declared an abdication, whereby the throne was rendered va-
cant, which induced a new settlement of the crown." Id. at 244-45. Recall the conflict




standing of his own to direct his will"-i.e., the ability to un-
derstand and follow the law 7-and so needs someone who will
understand for him, to prescribe and regulate his actions."
Children and madmen are not free under the law; only he who
truly knows and is capable of following the law is legally com-
petent.74 Similarly for Blackstone the task of the guardian is to
take care of someone who can not (yet) manage his own affairs
and thus needs a substitute to act for him. "The guardian with
us performs the office both of the tutor and curator of the
Roman laws; the former of which had the charge of the mainte-
nance and education of the minor, the latter the care of his
fortune."75 By Blackstone's time, then, the weight of authority
indicated that an incompetent has some sort of right at
law-not merely a privilege-to be fully represented. The sov-
ereign himself is simply the last alternative substitute at bar,
after the possibilities of kin and guardians have been ex-
hausted.76 It is no longer an option for the king to care for his
subjects or not, as he chooses; the king must step into the
breach.77 The upshot of the duty-privilege debate over the
parens patriae power for present day American law is that
parens patriae as a duty is outside the Executive's discretion;
although the power of parens patriae resided long in the Chan-
cery, it is not in this respect like a pardon, which is within the
Executive's discretion.78
72. LOCKE, supra note 62, at 144.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 144-45.
75. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 43, at 460.
76. "The government itself is, in a sense, the supreme guardian, whom the indi-
vidual guardian represents in its solicitude for the welfare of the wards. Guardianship,
therefore, is a trust of the highest and most sacred character." 12 R.C.L. Guardian and
Ward § 60 (1916) (footnotes omitted). See text accompanying note 90, infra.
77. And so it remains in English law to this day:
[Tihe inherent jurisdiction of the court over minors is derived from the
sovereign as parens patriae. Traditionally the sovereign is interested in
the welfare of his minor subjects who because of tender years are incapa-
ble of looking after themselves. "It is in the interest of the sovereign that
children should be properly brought up and educated; and according to
the principle of our law, the sovereign, as parens patriae, is bound to look
at the maintenance and education (as far as it has the means of judging)
of all of his subjects." The sovereign accords protection to all who owe
him allegiance . ...
DICEY AND MORRIS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 401 (J. Morris ed. 1973) (footnotes omit-
ted).
78. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 ("[The President] shall have Power to grant Reprieves
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As a matter of explicit legal doctrine, the parens patriae
developed as a trust between the guardian and the ward. The
guardian was acting on behalf of, that is, presumptively fur-
thering the welfare of, his charge, the guardian himself having
no material interest and acquiring no unfair gain from his serv-
ices. 9
For the law judges it improper to trust the person of an infant in
his hands, who may by possibility become heir to him; that there
may be no temptation, nor even suspicion of temptation, for him
to abuse his trust."
Originally, "the lord [of the manor] was entitled to the
wardship of the lands and person of those of unsound mind.
The crown acquired this wardship, to the exclusion of the lord,
probably by virtue of some statute or ordinance of the latter
end of the reign of Henry III [died 1272]."' Although early
English law divided the mentally unsound into idiots and luna-
tics, 2 "the 'clemency of the crown and the pity of the juries'
gradually assimilated the condition of idiots to that of luna-
tics." '83 Jurisdiction was eventually given to the chancellor,84
perhaps again because he represented the king's moral sensibil-
ity. 5 The governing principle is that the king's agent, the chan-
cellor, acts in the lunatic's interest and on his behalf.86 The
and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeach-
ment.").
79. 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 43, at 426-27; see also Beverley's Case (1603) 4 Co.
Rep. at f. 126 a; Tourson's Case (1611) 8 Co. Rep. 170 a; 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note
44, at 475.
80. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 43, at 461.
81. 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 44, at 473.
82. Id. at 474. "The idiot is one that hath had no understanding from his nativ-
ity;" the lunatic "is one who hath had understanding, but . ..hath lost the use of
his reason." 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 43, at 292, 294. The significance of the distinc-
tion was that guardianship in the case of idiots "was a profitable right analogous to
the right of wardship: in the [case of lunatics] it was in the nature of a duty, and no
profit could be made from it," 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 44, at 474. Why the distinc-
tion ever arose at all is a mystery, unless the idiot, who was deemed never to have had
any mental ability at all, was regarded as inferior, somehow less a person, and so less
worthy of protection than the lunatic, who had once enjoyed the use of his faculties.
83. 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 44, at 474: citation is to POPE, LUNACY 24 (1877).
84. Id. at 475. See also G. SPENCE, AN INQUIRY INTO THE ORIGIN OF THE LAWS AND
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS OF MODERN EUROPE, PARTICULARLY THOSE OF ENGLAND 561
(1826).
85. But see 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 44, at 475.
86. Id. at 476.
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situation was analogous in the case of equitable jurisdiction
over infants."7
The incapacity of the infant was not supplemented to any
very large extent by the powers of the guardian. The general
principle seems to be that the guardian must preserve the prop-
erty in statu quo, and strictly account."
By 1467 the essential notion behind suits in parens patriae
had already become settled case law. In that year, in a case
tried in Chancery, 9 defense argued that if the plaintiff had not
taken care to follow the rules of covenants, and if he thereby
suffered injury, it was injury justly incurred through the plain-
tiff's own foolishness. Nevertheless, the Chancellor proclaimed,
Deus est procurator fatuorum (God acts as attorney for fools),
and granted a subpoena against the defendant.
The maxim bears the stamp of rough and ready mediaeval
clericalism, and it opened the way for the Chancery to look be-
hind the external regularity of all sorts of transactions with a view
to the redress of wrongs committed by skillful miscreants who
had taken advantage of weakness of intellect, insufficient knowl-
edge, or casual negligence."
But whether it is God, the Chancellor, or the Attorney General
who brings suit on behalf of the incompetent, the doctrine of
parens patriae represents in essence the rectification of per-
ceived asymmetry or imbalance in the allocation of legal rights
and obligations.9
Thus the fundamental elements of the parens patriae doc-
trine in English law seem to be: (1) the party is incompetent
in law (and often in fact) to secure his rights; (2) there is no
other alternative than the sovereign or his representative; (3)
the sovereign has a duty to minister to his subjects' welfare;
(4) the sovereign as champion acts on someone else's behalf
and has no personal interest in the matter whatsoever.
87. 6 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 44, at 648-50.
88. Id. at 649.
89. Y.B.P. 8 Edw. IV, f. 4, 11 pl., reported in Vinogradoff, Reason and Conscience
in Sixteenth-Century Jurisprudence, 24 L.Q. REV. 373, 380 (1908), reprinted in 2 P.
VINOGRADOFF, COLLECrED PAPERS 190, 198-99 (1928).
90. Vinogradoff (1908), supra note 89, at 380.
91. See Attorney General v. Dublin (Mayor of), 1 Bligh N.S. 312 (1827), 4 Eng.
Rep. 888 (1901); Shaftsbury (Earl of) v. Shaftsbury, Gilb. Rep. 172 (1725), 25 Eng.
Rep. 121 (1903).
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B. American Doctrine
The American transformation of sovereignty under the
1787 Constitution was radical in two respects: it divided the
sovereign power between a federal government and its subordi-
nate states," and the sovereign thereby became no longer iden-
tifiable with a single individual or well-defined institution, but
rather became a totally corporate entity. 3
Dissolution of union with England brought to the fore
novel problems in redefining sovereignty as related to the union
of the thirteen states. In the pre-Constitutional era, the
newly-independent states governed themselves more as sepa-
rate commonwealths than as individual members of one na-
tion .15
Under the changing exigencies of their polemics and politics,
Americans needed some new contractual analogy to explain their
evolving relationships among themselves and with the state.
Only a social agreement among the people, only such a Lockean
contract, seemed to make sense of their rapidly developing idea
of a constitution as a fundamental law designed by the people to
be separate from and controlling of all the institutions of govern-
ment.11
The Federal Constitution, seen as a Lockean compact between
the member states and the central government,97 solved the
92. B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 198ff., 224-
29 (1971); G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 282ff.
(1969) [hereinafter cited as WOODI. "In America the powers of sovereignty are divided
between the government of the Union and those of the States." McCulloch v. Mary-
land, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 410 (1812).
93. See E. KANTOROWiCZ, THE KING'S Two BODIES: A STUDY IN MEDIEVAL POLITICAL
THEOLOGY (1957). The trend toward dissociation of the king's private from his public
or political status had been going on for some time and was recognized by Blackstone.
1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 43, at 155-57. The process of separating out the sovereign's
various legal capacities was continued into American law. In an important American
case the Supreme Court noted that "Georgia [had] sought to sue in four slightly
different capacities: its sovereign capacity . . . ; as a quasi-sovereign . . . ; its proprie-
tary capacity . . . ; and as protector of a general class of its citizens .... " Hawaii
v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 259 n.13 (1972), discussing Georgia v. Pennsyl-
vania R.R., 324 U.S. 439 (1945).
94. WOOD, supra note 92, at 282, 283.
95. Id. at 356-57. James Madison himself said: "Who are the parties to [the
Constitutional Convention]? The people. Not the people as composing one great body,
but the people as composing thirteen sovereignties." Quoted in C. WARREN, THE SU-
PREME COURT AND SOVEREIGN STATES 34 (1924) [hereinafter cited as WARREN].
96. WOOD, supra note 92, at 283 (footnote omitted).
97. LOCKE, supra note 62, at xvii-xviii; WOOD, supra note 92, at 283-84ff.
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problem of allotting sovereign power by implicitly recognizing
that the purpose of federation was not to detract from, but to
enhance and supplement, each state's governance of its own
citizens .9
In accordance with the Lockean scenario, then, the states
entered into the Federal Constitution out of perceived weak-
ness in the existing scheme of government, as exemplified in
the Articles of Confederation. On May 29, 1787, Governor
Edmund Randolph of Virginia introduced his proposal to the
Constitutional Convention for a new constitution, arguing that
"the federal government could not check the quarrels between
states.""0 In return for the protection afforded by having a su-
preme central tribunal for resolving disputes,0 0 the states for-
feited their rights to wage economic and military war.'"' In
return for acquiring some of the sovereign prerogatives of the
states, e.g., levying embargoes and armies, the central govern-
ment, for its part, accepted a duty to ensure the general welfare
of the states.02 Thus "[t]he state has a duty to its inhabitants
to provide for and protect their health, comfort and welfare"; 03
this duty, moreover, "is not merely a remote or ethical interest
but one which is immediate and recognized by law."''
Although a state could condescend to be brought before a
national court, by no means could a state be forced to so sub-
mit. The liability of a state to suits by citizens of another state
or a foreign country had in fact been promulgated by the Su-
98. The thinking of the colonial period had been heavily influenced by the theory
of Emmerich de Vattel: "[Sleveral sovereign and independent states may unite them-
selves together by a perpetual confederacy without each in particular ceasing to be a
perfect state . . . .The deliberations in common will offer no violence to the sover-
eignty of each member." E. DE VA'ITEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS; OR PRINCIPLES OF THE
LAW OF NATURE (1759-60), quoted in WOOD, supra note 92, at 355.
99. 1 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 19 (1911).
See generally THE FEDERALIST Nos. 6, 7, 8, 9, 15, 16, 17 (A. Hamilton), 10, 44 (J.
Madison); Woods & Reed, The Supreme Court and Interstate Environmental Quality:
Some Notes on the Wyandotte Case, 12 ARIZ. L. REv. 691, 705 (1970).
100. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; WARREN, supra note 95, at 4-5.
101. WARREN, supra note 95, at 34-35. See also Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324
U.S. 439, 450 (1945); Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907);
Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 241 (1901); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 21 (1890);
Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 728 (1838); Cohens v. Virginia,
19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 406-07 (1821).
102. See State Protection, supra note 6, at 431.
103. Id. (emphasis added).
104. Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 592 (1923).
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preme Court in Chisholm v. Georgia, ' 5 a decision which
"created such a shock of surprise throughout the country that,
at the first meeting of Congress thereafter, the Eleventh
Amendment to the Constitution was almost unanimously pro-
posed, and was in due course adopted by the legislatures of the
States."' 10 Thus the United States at first retained the ancient
tension between sovereign duty and sovereign liberty.0 7
A corollary of the American transformation of royal sover-
eignty into federal supremacy was the depersonification of the
sovereign under the separation of functions doctrine. The Chief
Executive retained a few of the prerogatives of the sovereign,'"'
the Attorney General or his delegate represented the sovereign
in court, 09 and the judiciary became the American successors
of the English courts of equity."0 In this way the notion of a
sovereign indulging in caprice where matters of individual
rights were concerned was rapidly to become obsolete in the
American scheme of government. Thus the first distinctive
American contribution to parens patriae doctrine was the
transmutation of sovereignty from monarch and parliament to
a federal state system, each state as "quasi-sovereign" enjoying
some of the governmental powers once exercised only by the
central sovereign."'
105. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1792).
106. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 11 (1890). "This amendment, expressing the
will of the ultimate sovereignty of the whole country . . . reversed the decision of the
Supreme Court." Id. U.S. CONST. amend. XI, ratified in 1798, provides: "The Judicial
power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another
State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." See generally Tribe,
Intergovernmental Immunities in Litigation, Taxation, and Regulation: Separation of
Powers Issues in Controversies About Federalism, 89 HARv. L. REV. 682 (1976).
107. See text accompanying notes 46-47.
108. For example, the pardon and appointive power, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
109. In the case of parens patriae, see, e.g., Baptist Ass'n v. Hart's Ex'rs, 17 U.S.
(4 Wheat.) 1 (1819); Kansas v. American Standard, Inc., 1970 Trade Cas. 73,013
(E.D. Pa. 1969).
110. Mormon Church v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 51-58 (1890); Fontain v. Rave-
nel, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 369, 389 (1854).
[I]n this country, there is no royal person to act as parens patriae, and
to give direction for the application of charities which cannot be adminis-
tered by the court. . . . [In the United States,] the legislature is the
parens patriae, and, unless restrained by constitutional limitations, pos-
sesses all the powers in this regard which the sovereign possesses in Eng-
land.
Mormon Church v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 56-57 (1890).
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The next task was to determine exactly what the exercise
of sovereign power now entailed. This the Supreme Court
began to do in Louisiana v. Texas. " Texas had set up a quar-
antine as a reaction to a single case of yellow fever reported in
New Orleans, an action which in effect placed an embargo on
commerce being shipped from New Orleans. Invoking the elev-
enth amendment,"3 the Court held that a suit in parenspatriae
could not be brought for the relief of particular individuals.
The harm or benefit involved must be public in nature, al-
though it is concededly difficult to distinguish a large number
of particular individuals from a segment of the public at large.
In order then to maintain jurisdiction of this bill of com-
plaint as against the State of Texas, it must appear that the
controversy to be determined is a controversy arising directly
between the State of Louisiana and the State of Texas, and not
a controversy in the vindication of grievances of particular
individuals....
... [I]n Debs, Petitioner, 158 U.S. 564, . . . it was ob-
served: "That while it is not the province of the Government to
interfere in any mere matter of private controversy between indi-
viduals, or to use its great powers to enforce the rights of one
against another, yet, whenever the wrongs complained of are such
as affect the public at large, and are in respect of matters which
by the Constitution are intrusted to the care of the Nation, and
concerning which the Nation owes the duty to all the citizens of
securing to them their common rights, then the mere fact that
the Government has no pecuniary interest in the controversy is
not sufficient to exclude it from the courts or prevent it from
taking measures therein to fully discharge those constitutional
duties."
It is in this aspect that the bill before us is framed. Its grava-
men is not a special and peculiar injury such as would sustain an
111. [W]hen this country achieved its independence, the preroga-
tives of the crown devolved upon the people of the States. And this power
still remains with them, except so far as they have delegated a portion of
it to the federal government. The sovereign will is made known to us by
legislative enactment. The State, as a sovereign, is the parens patriae.
Fontain v. Ravenel, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 369, 384 (1854). See also Hawaii v. Standard
Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 257 (1972); California v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 474 F.2d 774, 776 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973); 4 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW
536 (W. Lacy ed. 1889); Wagner, The Original and Exclusive Jurisdiction of the United
States Supreme Court, 2 ST. Louis U.L.J. 111, 147-52 (1952); Note, The Original
Jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court, 11 STAN. L. REv. 665, 671-80 (1959).
112. 176 U.S. 1 (1900).
113. Id. at 16.
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action by a private person, but the State of Louisiana presents
herself in the attitude of parens patriae, trustee, guardian or
representative of all her citizens. . . . [Tihe State [of Louis-
iana] is entitled to seek relief in this way because the matters
complained of affect her citizens at large.114
Thus a further major requirement for parens patriae suits is
that the state have some overriding transcendent interest, so
that "the State, as the representative of the public, has an
interest apart from that of the individuals affected.""' The
state's interest is in fulfilling its duty to secure and maintain
the general welfare.
In two cases decided in succeeding years, Missouri v.
Illinois"' and Kansas v. Colorado,"7 the Supreme Court sus-
tained a state's claim to injunctive relief as parens patriae in
order to protect not only the property but the actual health and
comfort of its citizens. These cases suggest the wide scope of
legitimate concerns which the state might have as parens
patriae, a range of interests certainly broader than the oversee-
ing of individual incompetents and charitable establishments
recognized in English law. In the twin cases
no question of boundary is involved, nor of direct property rights
belonging to the complainant State. But it must surely be con-
ceded that, if the health and comfort of the inhabitants of a State
are threatened, the State is the proper party to represent and
defend them. . . .The health and comfort of the large communi-
ties inhabiting those parts of the State situated on the Missis-
sippi River are not alone concerned, but contagious and typhoi-
dal diseases introduced in the river communities may spread
themselves throughout the territory of the State ...
114. Id. at 16, 19. For other suits denied parens patriae status on this criterion,
see North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365 (1923); Oklahoma v. Atchison, Topeka
& Santa Fe Ry., 220 U.S. 277 (1911); Kansas v. United States, 204 U.S. 331 (1907);
New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76 (1883). See also Massachusetts v. Missouri,
308 U.S. 1, 17 (1939) (state may not invoke original jurisdiction of Supreme Court to
enforce rights of individual citizens); accord, Oklahoma ex rel. Johnson v. Cook, 304
U.S. 387 (1938); Republic of Iraq v. First Nat'l Bank, 350 F.2d 645, 648-49 (7th Cir.
1965) ("Federal courts will not entertain a suit at the instance of the United States if
the suit is in reality one between private individuals." Id. at 648.).
115. Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 592 (1923). "In [the quasi-
sovereign capacity of parens patriael the State has an interest independent of and
behind the titles of its citizens, in all the earth and air within its domain." Georgia v.
Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907); see generally J. MOORE, COMMENTARY
ON THE UNITED STATES JUDICIAL CODE 624-25 (1949).
116. 180 U.S. 208 (1901).
117. 185 U.S. 125 (1902).
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[Slubstantial impairment of the health and prosperity of the
towns and cities of the State situated on the Mississippi River
...would injuriously affect the entire State.
That suits brought by individuals, each for personal injuries,
threatened or received, would be wholly inadequate and dispro-
portionate remedies, requires no argument."'
In this holding a third fundamental principle of American
parens patriae emerges: the generous conception of what the
common welfare includes." 9
Since the state as parens patriae can sue to protect the
welfare of its citizenry as a whole, a parens patriae claim could
actually oppose the interests of some of the state's citizens.
This possibility was appreciated by Justice Holmes in Georgia
v. Tennessee Copper Co., 20 a case in which Georgia as parens
patriae sought injunctive relief against a factory in Tennessee
which was pouring noxious fumes into Georgia from across the
state line. Though some workers from Georgia at that factory
stood to lose their jobs, "[ilt is a fair and reasonable demand
on the part of a sovereign that the air over its territory should
not be polluted on a great scale. . . .Whether Georgia by in-
sisting upon this claim is doing more harm than good to her
own citizens is for her to determine."'' The state's interest as
parens patriae, then, is a constructive, presumptive interest
applied to the major or most acutely affected portion 2 of the
class concerned-a class whose interests may in fact conflict.
The interests of a small group, therefore, may be subordinated
to the more compelling interests of the populace as a whole,
under this reading of the parens patriae capacity.
The doctrine of parens patriae in American law, therefore,
while retaining the essential elements of its English fore-
118. Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1902); Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S.
208, 241 (1901). See also New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 301-02 (1921).
119. The extent to which such broad protection may be construed is indicated by
recent dicta: "Aesthetic and environmental well-being, like economic well-being, are
important ingredients of the quality of life in our society .... " Sierra Club v. Morton,
405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972). See also Association of Data Processing Service Orgs., Inc.
v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970).
120. 206 U.S. 230 (1907).
121. Id. at 238, 239. See also Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923).
122. See Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923). Land O'Lakes Crea-
meries, Inc. v. Louisiana State Bd. of Health, 160 F. Supp. 387, 389 (E.D. La. 1958),
implies that "Minnesota [would have] the right to sue as parens patriae in behalf of
all, or a substantial number, of her citizens." (emphasis added).
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bears, 2 ' developed four additional basic principles: (1) devolu-
tion of part of the sovereign's duty of protection to the states
as "quasi-sovereigns"; (2) protection not to be extended on
behalf of particular individuals; (3) extension of the scope of
protection to the various economic and noneconomic compo-
nents of the public good; (4) state's interest as parens patriae
presumptively, but not necessarily actually, coincides with all
the members of the patria.
Having seen how the seminal decisions in American case
law enlarged upon English policies, it remains to observe how
the American version of parens patriae has fared in subsequent
invocations of the doctrine. Only two parens patriae cases seek-
ing treble damages for antitrust violations have reached the
Supreme Court: Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R.,' 2' and Hawaii
v. Standard Oil Co.' In the earlier case, Georgia sued defen-
dant railroads for fixing noncompetitive and discriminatory
rates in (inter alia) her capacity as a quasi-sovereign or parens
patriae and in her proprietary capacity as the owner of a rail-
road and railroad facilities. Citing Georgia v. Evans,2 ' the
Court first ruled that Georgia, suing for her own injuries, is a
"person" within the meaning of section 16 of the Clayton Act;",
additionally, "she is authorized to maintain suits to restrain
violations of the anti-trust laws or to recover damages by rea-
123. For early cases in America depending primarily on English doctrine, see
Fontain v. Ravenel, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 369 (1854); In re Turner, 94 Kan. 115, 145 P.
871 (1915); Sporza v. German Sav. Bank, 192 N.Y. 8, 84 N.E. 406 (1908); McIntosh v.
Dill, 86 Okla. 1,205 P. 917 (1922); In re Hughes' Estate, 231 Pa. 475, 80 A. 1104 (1911).
124. 324 U.S. 439 (1945), comment in 32 VA. L. REv. 157 (1945).
125. 405 U.S. 251 (1972), aff'g 431 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1970), rev'g 301 F. Supp.
982 (D. Hawaii 1969). See Handler, Twenty-Five Years of Antitrust, 73 COLUM. L. REV.
415, 423-30 (1973); Comment, Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co.: Aloha to Parens Patriae?,
22 CATH. U.L. REv. 156 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Aloha]; Comment, State Recovery
of Money Damages, 22 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 789 (1971). See also Case Comment, 15
ST. Louis U.L.J. 311 (1970).
126. 316 U.S. 159 (1942).
127. The Clayton Act § 16 provides in relevant part:
Any person, firm, corporation, or association shall be entitled to sue for
and have injunctive relief, in any court of the United States having juris-
diction over the parties, against threatened loss or damage by a violation
of the antitrust laws, . . .when and under the same conditions and
principles as injunctive relief against threatened conduct that will cause
loss or damage is granted by courts of equity ....
15 U.S.C. § 26 (1970).
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son thereof." 2 ' The injury, moreover, was serious enough to
invoke the Court's jurisdiction.
If the allegations of the bill are taken as true, the economy
of Georgia and the welfare of her citizens have seriously suffered
as the result of this alleged conspiracy. Discriminatory rates are
but one form of trade barriers. They may cause a blight no less
serious than the spread of noxious gas over the land or the deposit
of sewage in the streams. They may affect the prosperity and
welfare of a State as profoundly as any diversion of waters from
the rivers. . . . They may arrest the development of a State or
put it at a decided disadvantage in competitive markets ...
These are matters of grave public concern in which Georgia has
an interest apart from that of particular individuals who may be
affected. Georgia's interest is not remote; it is immediate. If we
denied Georgia as parens patriae the right to invoke the original
jurisdiction of the Court in a matter of that gravity, we would
whittle the concept of justiciability down to the stature of minor
or conventional controversies. There is no warrant for such a
restriction. 2 9
The Court let the parens patriae suit lie. Georgia's com-
plaint was consistent with the criteria of public (as opposed to
private) protection, a presumptive interest in the welfare of its
citizens as an integral whole, and a grave problem falling under
the state's police power to resolve.'30 However, the Court dec-
lined to decide whether a parens patriae suit will support a
treble damage claim, here following Keogh v. Chicago & N. W.
Ry.' 3' to the extent that "damages under the anti-trust laws
may not be recovered against railroad carriers though the rates
approved by the [Interstate Commerce] Commission were
fixed pursuant to a conspiracy."'' 2 By all but eliminating treble
damages as a remedy in a parens patriae antitrust suit, the
Court strongly suggests that injunctive relief is indeed avail-
able, though the Court never explicitly says as much.'
33 Just
as Georgia strongly suggests (but does not conclusively prove)
that injunctive relief is available in parens patriae suits, so
128. 324 U.S. at 447.
129. Id. at 450, 451.
130. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923), added the qualification that
a state could not act as parens patriae on behalf of its citizens against the United
States. Id. at 485-86. Accord, Pennsylvania v. Kleppe, 533 F.2d 668 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 97 S. Ct. 485 (1976).
131. 260 U.S. 156 (1922).
132. 324 U.S. at 452.
133. Id. at 460.
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does Georgia strongly suggest that treble damages in parens
patriae antitrust suits may not be recovered. In the only parens
patriae claim considered in the opinion, Count 2 of Georgia's
bill of complaint,'34 Georgia did not seek treble damages under
the antitrust laws; where it did seek such damages was in
Count 3, in its proprietary capacity.'35
There matters stood until Hawaii. Like Georgia, the later
case was a parens patriae suit against defendant corporations,
seeking monetary and'injunctive relief under the federal anti-
trust laws-not section 16 of the Clayton Act this time, but
section 4.136 Nevertheless the Court ruled expressly that
"Hawaii plainly qualifies as a person under both sections of the
statute. ,",3 The Court rejected Hawaii's suit, emphasiz-
ing the fact that section 4's requirement of injury to "business
or property" was not repeated in section 16, which suggested,
at least to the five-man majority, that Congress intended dif-
ferent remedies to lie for the two provisions.'38
Thus, § 4 permits Hawaii to sue in its proprietary capacity
for three times the damages it has suffered from respondents'
alleged antitrust violations .... When the State seeks damages
for injuries to its commercial interests, it may sue under § 4. But
where, as here, the State seeks damages for other injuries, 39 it is
not properly within the Clayton Act. 4 '
To allow Hawaii to recover treble damages "for injury to its
general economy, [would be to] open the door to duplicative
134. Georgia sought treble damages as parens patriae on behalf of a limited class
of citizens in Count 4, but only Counts 2 and 3 were discussed by the Court.
135. Brief for Plaintiff at 11, Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439 (1945).
Ultimately, the Court, relying on Keogh, denied damages to Georgia, on the purely
technical ground that the allegedly excessive freight charges were in fact legal because
already approved by the ICC. 324 U.S. at 453.
136. The Clayton Act § 4 provides:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district
court of the United States in the district in which the defendant resides
or is found or has an agent, without respect to the amount in controversy,
and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost
of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
137. 405 U.S. at 261. The Court relied, as did the State of Hawaii, on Georgia v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439 (1945). See also Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S. 159 (1942).
138. 405 U.S. at 261-62.
139. That is, to its general economy, and not to its business or property as defined
by the Court. Id. at 263 n.14.
140. Id. at 262, 264.
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recoveries."'' The Court said that both individuals and the
state could seek injunctive relief for the same violation:
"[Olne injunction is as effective as 100, and, concomitantly,
...100 injunctions are no more effective than one."' 42
Two points about the Hawaii decision need to be made.
First, the opinion notes that "[tihe District Court dismissed
Hawaii's class action . . .because it was unwieldy,"'4 but it
fails to mention any alternative to the class action as an effec-
tive method of obtaining relief. The parens patriae posture was
rejected, but with the jettisoning of the class action suit as well
the parties are apparently without remedy. Recall that the
sovereign as parens patriae is the champion of those parties
who would otherwise be without remedy' 44-if there is a just
complaint, there should be a way of vindicating it. Second,
even if treble damages are not awarded,' the Court says noth-
ing in Hawaii or elsewhere about the possibility of other forms
of monetary awards, for example, actual damages.
IV. FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS' STANDING TO SUE
The Eighth Circuit has now held that foreign governments
are "persons" entitled to sue for treble damages under section
4 of the Clayton Act.4 ' Noting that a foreign government's
standing turns solely on statutory interpretation and hence
Congressional intent, the opinion contains a comment concern-
ing the paucity of pertinent material: "Two decisions of the
United States Supreme Court offer guidance, but beyond these
we find little relevant help in construing the statute."'4 7 The
two cases mentioned are United States v. Cooper Corp.4 ' and
Georgia v. Evans;'49 the latter case was found controlling. The
141. Id. at 263-64. According to the Court, this is because individuals in their
private capacity could sue the same companies for the same offense.
142. Id. at 261.
143. Id. at 266. See also id. at 254, 256 n.6; 431 F.2d at 1282 n.3.
144. See text accompanying notes 76-77, supra.
145. Treble damages were intended to induce private parties to participate in the
enforcement of antitrust legislation. 405 U.S. at 275.
146. Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 1976-1 Trade Cas. 60,892 (8th Cir.,
May 19, 1976), aff'd en banc 1976-2 Trade Cas. 61,175 (8th Cir., Sept. 3, 1976), cert.
granted 45 U.S.L.W. 3690 (U.S. Apr. 18, 1977) (No. 76-749).
147. Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 1976-1 Trade Cas. $ 60,892, at 68,877
[hereinafter cited as Pfizer].
148. 312 U.S. 600 (1941). See note 157, infra.
149. 316 U.S. 159 (1942). See note 157, infra.
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court relied on Justice Frankfurter's majority opinion in Evans,
which stated that Cooper did not mean that a governmental
body could not be included in the word "person."' 5 ° This was,
nevertheless, a virtual about-face, since Cooper had held that
the United States Government was not entitled to sue for treble
damages because it had alternative sanctions given uniquely to
it." ' Foreign governments, according to the recent Eighth Cir-
cuit decision, are analogous to domestic states in lacking these
alternative sanctions and so have standing under section 4 of
the Clayton Act.'
Two points in the decision are especially remarkable: first,
the admission of the lack of articulate antitrust policy with
respect to foreign nations and, second, the desire to ensure that
a foreign government has redress against American corpora-
tions through one provision or another. To take up the first
point, India's capacity to sue for treble damages depends on
whether or not it is a "person" under section 4 of the Clayton
Act. 53 Generally speaking, the construction of key terms in
antitrust, as in other, legislation turns on the particular policy
Congress has decided to effect.'54 Yet Congressional policy with
150. Pfizer, supra note 147, at 68,878, quoting Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S. at 161.
151. Pfizer, supra note 147, at 68,878.
152. Id. at 68,879.
153. 522 F.2d at 614 n.3. See also Foreign Sovereigns, supra note 4, at 139. See
generally W. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTrrausT LAws (2d ed. 1973); E.
KuwrriFa & M. JOELSON, AN INTRNATIONAL ANTrruST PRIMER (1974); Kintner, Joelson
& Vaghi, Groping for a Truly International Antitrust Law, 14 VA. J. INT'L L. 75 (1973);
Velvel, Antitrust Suits by Foreign Nations, 25 CATH. U. L. REv. 1 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Velvel]; Note, Extraterritorial Application of United States Laws: A Conflict
of Laws Approach, 28 STAN. L. REv. 1005, 1017-20 (1976).
It is well established that phrases such as "any person" (as in Clayton Act §§ 4,
16) and "every person" in a statute need not extend the statute's applicability beyond
the nation's borders ad infinitum. "The words 'any person or persons,' are broad
enough to comprehend every human being. But general words must not only be limited
to cases within the jurisdiction of the state, but also to those objects to which the
legislature intended to apply them." United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610,
631 (1818); accord McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372
U.S. 10, 19-21 (1963); Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 576-79 (1953).
154. "[The antitrust] statutes do not provide a precise description of prohibited
activities. They are couched in broad terms and, for the most part, the terms are
undefined. A basic provision, for example, prohibits combinations 'in restraint of
trade,' but Congress has left it to the courts to decide case by case what particular
business practices fall under this rubric." PARENS PATRIaE BILL, supra note 7, at 3.
"Arguably, the words 'any person' appearing in section 4 of the Clayton Act evidence
an intent by Congress to confer a remedy upon every juristic entity injured by the
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regard to foreign governments' status under American antitrust
laws is virtually nonexistent:' from the Sherman Act to the
present, there has been no major and definitive discussion by
Congress of American antitrust policy vis-a-vis foreign sover-
eigns. 51 Not until 1941,111 in fact, did the Supreme Court have
antitrust laws. The term 'any person' has been broadly interpreted; as the Supreme
Court has pointed out, 'The Act is comprehensive in its terms and coverage, protecting
all who are made victims of the forbidden practices by whomever they may be perpe-
trated."' Foreign Sovereigns, supra note 4, at 150, quoting Mandeville Island Farms,
Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 236 (1948).
Since, in common usage, the term 'person' does not include the sov-
ereign, statutes employing the phrase are ordinarily construed to exclude
it. But there is no hard and fast rule of exclusion. The purpose, the
subject matter, the context, the legislative history, and the executive
interpretation of the statute are aids to construction which may indicate
an intent, by the use of the term, to bring state or nation within the scope
of the law.
United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 604-05 (1941) (footnotes omitted).
"[Tihe most important thing to keep in mind is the result orientation with which the
Court has approached the whole area of private treble-damage litigation." West Vir-
ginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079, 1087 (2d Cir. 1971) (emphasis added).
The pivotal concepts in antitrust law are thus defined functionally, i.e., based on
legislative decisions as to who and what to protect: who will constitute a "person" and
what will constitute "business or property" for purposes of the legislation. For defini-
tion of "person" as founded on legislative policy, see 139 A.L.R. 1019-20 (1942). For
open-ended concept of "business" as employed by the Hawaii court, 405 U.S. at 264,
see Roseland v. Phister Mfg. Co., 125 F.2d 417, 419 (7th Cir. 1942). For definition of
"property," see Waldron v. British Petroleum, 231 F. Supp. 72 (S.D.N.Y. 1964): "The
word 'property' is, in a sense, a conclusory term, i.e., an interest which the law protects.
A determination whether plaintiff has 'property' involves a value judgment as to
whether that which plaintiff factually possesses should be legally protected." 231 F.
Supp. at 86.
155. "The most effective argument that can be made against permitting foreign
sovereign antitrust suits is that there was no such legislative intent. Nowhere in the
legislative history of the antitrust laws is there any indication that Congress contem-
plated foreign governments asserting treble-damage actions .... " Foreign Sover-
eigns, supra note 4, at 144. Silence, however, has generally been considered an unrelia-
ble guide to legislative intent. Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946). ("It is at
best treacherous to find in congressional silence alone the adoption of a controlling rule
of law." Id. at 69); Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119-21 (1940). But see United
States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947) ("The absence of any comparable
provision [in the Norris-LaGuardia Act] extending the term ["person"] to sovereign
governments implies that Congress did not desire the term to extend to them." Id. at
275).
156. Though the Congressional hearings on the parens patriae legislation, supra
note 7, contain over a thousand pages of prepared statements and personal testimony,
there is not a single extended analysis of how the then pending legislation would affect
foreign governments suing in parens patriae capacity.
157. In United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600 (1941), the Supreme Court
decided that the United States was not a "person" for purposes of the Sherman Act §
7, which grants the right of action for treble damages to "any person" injured in his
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to decide whether the United States itself qua sovereign was a
"person" for purposes of section 7 of the Sherman Act.'
The Sherman Act and its succeeding legislation were en-
acted to achieve two basic goals: (1) to protect and promote the
interests of Americans by providing the best products at the
lowest possible prices'5" and (2) to make sure that American
corporations were managing their businesses fairly.6 0 Until the
current Pfizer litigation, 6' these two objectives were seen in the
business or property by practices forbidden in the Act. In Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S.
159 (1942), the Court found the State of Georgia to be a person under the same
provision of the Sherman Act, since "[tihe State of Georgia, unlike the United States,
cannot prosecute violations of the Sherman Law. . . . If the State is not a
'person'..., the Sherman Law leaves it without any redress for injuries resulting from
practices outlawed by that Act." 316 U.S. at 162. See also Chattanooga Foundry v.
Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390 (1906), holding that a city is a person under Sherman Act § 7.
158. The decision was based on two factors: (1) If Congress had meant to include
the United States in the coverage of the provision, it would have done so explicitly.
312 U.S. at 607. (2) The remedy of treble damages would be "more appropriate for a
private litigant than for the United States." 312 U.S. at 606. Yet the Court implies
that the terms referred to both natural and artificial persons, i.e., individuals and
corporations, without remarking that Congress did not make this interpretation ex-
plicit by incorporating it into the Act. The appropriateness of treble damages for a
foreign sovereign is thus left unresolved. On the one hand, it can be argued that foreign
governments have sufficient resources not to require treble damage awards. On the
other hand, this assumption is severely strained with respect to the small-
geographically and economically-governments of the "emerging" nations.
In 1955, the United States was expressly declared a "person" under the Clayton
Act by Pub. L. No. 137, ch. 283, amending Clayton Act § 4 and repealing Sherman
Act § 7.
159. "[The Sherman Act's] best effect will be a warning that all trade and
commerce, all agreements and arrangements, . . . must be governed by the universal
law that the public good must be the test of all." 21 CONG. REc. 2462 (1890) (Remarks
of Senator Sherman). "Every violation of the antitrust laws is a blow to the free-
enterprise system envisaged by Congress. . . .This system depends on strong compe-
tition for its health and vigor .. " Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. at 262. See
also House Report 3-4, quoted in PAmms PATmsL BnL, supra note 7, at 9.
160. "A basic purpose of the [parens patriae] bill is to deter violations by pre-
venting 'unjust enrichment' of offenders." PARENS PATIR BiLL, supra note 7, at 13.
Thus the Supreme Court limited the "passing-on" defense in antitrust litigation,
because "[tihose who violate the antitrust laws by price fixing or monopolizing would
retain the fruits of their illegality because no one [would be] available [to] bring suit
against them." Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 494
(1968). See also PARENs PATm.A BilL, supra note 7, at 14. See generally Schaefer, The
Passing-On Theory in Antitrust Treble Damage Actions: An Economic and Legal
Analysis, 16 WM. & MARY L. Rav. 883 (1975). But see Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 45
U.S.L.W. 4611 (U.S. June 9, 1977).
161. The question whether a foreign sovereign is a "person" under American
antitrust laws is "apparently" a case of first impression. In re Antibiotic Antitrust
Actions, 333 F. Supp. 315, 316 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
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single context of domestic regulation and were parallel and
complementary to one another. But by barring a foreign sover-
eign from American courts under our antitrust laws, the one
goal does not necessarily follow from the other. That is, the
American economy and balance of payments can actually be
improved, at least in the short run, by allowing American com-
panies to keep all their revenues from their foreign operations.
This was seen, however dimly, as early as the Webb-Pomerene
Act of 1918, '"2 which was enacted only four years after the Clay-
ton Act. It permitted the existence of "an association entered
into for the .. .purpose of engaging in export trade, . . . or
an agreement made or act done in the course of export trade
by such association, ' '6 3 as long as this (conceivably monopolis-
tic) combination does not act to restrain trade within the
United States proper. The historical background of this bill" 4
suggests that "[tihe dominant theme of the congressional
debates . . .was that American corporations should get the
highest prices possible for their products overseas, regardless of
what foreigners were made to pay."'65
Characteristically, and in this case probably prudently,
the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit left to the legisla-
ture the resolution of the broad policy issues involved in grant-
ing capacity to foreign governments, 66 not even mentioning the
162. 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65 (1970). See United States Alkali Export Ass'n v. United
States, 325 U.S. 196 (1945); Simmons, The Webb-Pomerene Act and Antitrust Policy,
1963 Wisc. L. Rxv. 426; Chapman, Exports and Antitrust: Must Competition Stop at
the Water's Edge?, 6 VAND. J. TRAs. L. 399 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Chapmanl.
163. 15 U.S.C. § 62 (1970).
164. The term typically used by the federal courts in connection with ascertaining
congressional intent in antitrust legislation is "legislative environment," i.e., the con-
text from which the policy conclusions are to be derived. Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S.
159, 161 (1942), citing Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 360, 370 (1934).
165. Foreign Sovereigns, supra note 4, at 147. Thus Congressman Webb stated:
"I would be willing that there should be a combination between anybody or anything
for the purpose of capturing the trade of the world, if they do not punish the people of
the United States in doing it." 55 CONo. REc. 3580 (1917). In a similar vein, Senator
Pomerene said, "[W]e have not reached that high plane of business morals which will
permit us to extend the same privilege to the people of the earth outside of the United
States that we extend to those within the United States." Id. at 2787. See also the
remarks of a contemporary member of Congress: "I have no sympathy with what a
foreigner pays for our products; I would like to see the American manufacturer get the
largest price possible .. " Hearings on H.R. 16707 Before the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1916).
166. Pfizer, supra note 147, at 3 n.4. For discussion of some of the policy issues
involved, see Foreign Sovereigns, supra note 4, at 150-52; Velvel, supra note 153.
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familiar doctrine of comity of nations. 7 In thus deferring to the
legislature, the court correctly hints that it is high time to settle
these issues, issues which are bound to figure even more promi-
nently in the near future. The court also correctly recognizes
that there is no legitimate reason for a foreign nation to be
deprived of a remedy against admitted wrongs committed by
American corporations under American antitrust laws: to this
point we now turn.
V. PARENS PATRIAE OR CLASS ACTION?
Since India has capacity to sue, it faces a choice of litiga-
tion strategy from among a parens patriae suit, a rule 23 class
action, and a suit in its proprietary capacity. The last possibil-
ity is not important given the circumstances, since India could
However, the Supreme Court has adumbrated a position that would seem to favor the
granting of standing to foreign governments:
[T]he provisions in the Sherman Act against restraints of foreign trade
are based on the assumption, and reflect the policy, that export and
import trade in commodities is both possible and desirable. Those provi-
sions of the Act are wholly inconsistent with appellant's argument that
American business must be left free to participate in international car-
tels, that free foreign commerce in goods must be sacrificed in order to
foster export of American dollars for investment in foreign factories which
sell abroad.
Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 599 (1951). See A. NEALE,
THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE U.S.A. 342-72 (2d ed. 1970) and cases therein cited.
167. The doctrine of comity of nations might ironically be used against India's
cause: "[W]e should expect that other nations and communities will use their anti-
trust laws to protect their consumers against those who restrain competition in their
markets." Baker, Antitrust and World Trade: Tempest in an International Teapot?, 8
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 16, 41 (1974) (emphasis in original). See Chapman, supra note 162,
at 403, and see Judge Lord's narrow ground of decision:
A conspiracy among domestic producers of antibiotic drugs to reduce or
eliminate competition as to foreign sales would certainly have an adverse
effect on domestic competition. Not only would it enable the domestic
manufacturers to build up a substantial "war chest" from excessive prof-
its from foreign sales but such a conspiracy might prevent either a domes-
tic or a foreign manufacturer from entering into the foreign market in
order to build up its strength to enter into the restricted domestic market.
In an age of expanding world trade, a truly successful monopoly requires
control of both domestic and foreign markets. For these reasons, this
court is convinced that the fundamental goal of the antitrust laws could
be seriously frustrated by not permitting Kuwait to maintain a treble
damage action for damages resulting from the alleged conspiracy.
In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp.
315, 316-17 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
The locus classicus of American comity of nations doctrine is The Sapphire, 78
U.S. (11 Wall.) 164 (1870).
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bring a suit in its proprietary capacity only for drugs brought
by the government itself, not for antibiotics bought by private
individuals or organizations. In a proprietary suit, the govern-
ment is not acting as a public representative but as a private
plaintiff appearing on its own behalf or as a guardian ad
litem. '""
The choice thus is finally between utilizing parens patriae
or class action to vindicate the rights of Indian citizens. The
federal courts have demonstrated a marked preference for the
class action suit;6 9 indeed the Supreme Court in Hawaii was
surprisingly unresponsive to the argument that a class action
suit was impractical under the circumstances. 70 Yet there is
nothing sacrosanct about a class action. The class action suit
itself was originally a concession to practicality and conveni-
ence in the consolidation of similar and related claims. 7' The
same considerations of prudence and practicality should like-
wise obtain here, where the Hawaii and Pfizer cases have so
dramatically shown the limitations of the class action's useful-
ness.
The Hawaii court in effectively eliminating the parens
patriae suit as an alternative to the class action ignored its
previous sound reasoning:
The judiciary is an indispensable part of the operation of our
federal system. With the growing complexities of government it
is often the one and only place where effective relief can be ob-
tained .... [Wihere wrongs to individuals are done by viola-
168. California v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 474 F.2d 774 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S.
908 (1973). See generally Fraenkel, The Juristic Status of Foreign States, Their Prop-
erty and Their Acts, 25 COLUM. L. REv. 544, 549-50 (1925). If India sought to bring a
class action suit (assuming foreign governments have capacity and standing to sue
under Clayton Act § 4), it would have to meet the typicality requirement of FED. R.
Cry. P. 23 (a)(3), and, thus, in any event would have to allege damage to a proprietary
interest. Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 522 F.2d at 617. (Hereinafter "India" will be used for
illustrative purposes to designate a foreign country which has been found to have both
capacity and standing; under present treaty arrangements, only Iran among the named
plaintiffs in the current Pfizer case possesses both capacity and standing to sue, see
note 216, infra.)
169. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 266 (1972); see also Velvel, supra
note 153, at 1. For an appraisal of the comparative merits of the parens patriae and
class action suits from the economic point of view, see Dam, Class Actions: Efficiency,
Compensation, Deterrence, and Conflict of Interest, 4 J. LEG. STUD. 47, 64-66 (1975).
170. 405 U.S. at 266.
171. Z. CHAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQuTY 200-01 (1950); Marcin, Searching for
the Origin of the Class Action, 23 CATH. U. L. REv. 515 (1974).
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tion of specific guarantees, it is abdication for courts to close their
doors. 72
The parens patriae suit is a valuable supplement to the class
action as a consumer remedy, especially in a transnational con-
text. In fact the only feature parens patriae and class action
suits have in common is the requirement of numerous wronged
parties.' Unlike the parens patriae suit, the class action (or
more specifically the federal rules of procedure for a class ac-
tion)' requires: (1) homogeneous interests; 7 ' (2) best possible
notification;' (3) a minimum jurisdictional amount.'77 Fur-
172. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 111 (1968).
173. See Land O'Lakes Creameries v. Louisiana, 160 F. Supp. 387 (E.D. La.
1958); Fed. Rules Advisory Comm. Report on Rule 23(a); cf. Smith v. Swormstedt, 57
U.S. (16 How.) 288 (1853) (one of the first class action suits recognized by the Supreme
Court). On the problems concerning the size of the class, see Grossman, Manageability
and the Fluid Recovery Doctrine, 47 LAB. BULL. 415 (1972); Malina, Fluid Class Recov-
ery as a Consumer Remedy in Antitrust Cases, 47 N.Y.U.L. REv. 477 (1972); Comment,
Manageability Problems of the Class Action Under Rule 23(b)(3), 6 U. SAN FRAN. L.
REv. 313 (1972); Comment, Administrative Problems, 60 Nw. U.L. REV. 1000 (1974).
See also Kalven & Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. CH1.
L. REV. 684 (1941). See generally 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE §§ 1751 et seq. (1969); 3B J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, 23-1 et
seq. (1975).
174. Class action suits are authorized and governed by FED. R. Civ. P. 23. See
generally Developments in the Law of Federal Class Action Litigation - Catch 22 in
Rule 23, 10 HOUSTON L. REv. 337 (1973); Developments in the Law - Class Actions,
89 HAav. L. REV. 1319 (1976).
175. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2), (b)(1)(B), (b)(3). Homogeneity of interest ensures
that any plaintiff member of the class will fairly and accurately reflect the interests of
all the members of the class, whether present or absent. This is important since the
absent plaintiffs' interests are decided by the class suit as res judicata. Pennoyer v.
Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878); under revised rule 23(c)(3), the decision in a class action suit
is res judicata as to all members of the class who did not act to exclude themselves
from the suit. That such homogeneity was required by due process was stressed by the
Supreme Court in Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940), and subsequent cases.
176. The adequacy of notice requirement of due process was first articulated in
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust, 339 U.S. 306 (1950). The case did not
involve a rule 23 class action, but did involve judicial settlement of a trust fund with
numerous beneficiaries. The court ruled that notice would have to be mailed to those
beneficiaries whose addresses could be readily ascertained, and for those whose ad-
dresses were not known notice by publication was sufficient. 339 U.S. at 317-20.
For further commentary on the issues of due process raised by Mullane, see Com-
ment, Adequate Representation, Notice and the New Class Action Rule: Effectuating
Remedies Provided by the Securities Laws, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 889 (1968); Note,
Constitutional and Statutory Requirements of Notice Under Rule 23(c)(2), 10 B.C.
IND. & CoM. L. REv. 571 (1969). See generally 7A WRIGHT & MILLER § 1786.
The recent major case of Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974), a rule
23 class action against the two major odd-lot dealers on the New York Stock Exchange,
interpreted rule 23(c)(2) to require that "[i]ndividual notice must be sent to all class
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ther, the class action in general differs from the parens patriae
suit in that a class action seeks to protect individual and par-
ticular interests.
Two major issues in class action litigation deserve com-
ment with respect both to the present India suit and to parens
patriae suits in general. One is the binding effect of the notice
requirement; the other is the problem of financing such a suit.
The first issue revolves around the question: Is it fair to bind
all the members of the class on the basis of one decision?' The
class action arose as a measure in equity to ensure fairly and
efficiently the rights of plaintiffs too numerous to appear in
court, and also too numerous to inform adequately using the
average individual plaintiff's private means.7 ' But the courts
have generally come to hold, in a manner analogous to their
answer to the problem of conflicting interests within the group
represented by the parens patriae, 110 that the utilitarian calcu-
members whose names and addresses may be ascertained through reasonable effort,"
despite the cost to petitioner. 417 U.S. at 173-75. For commentary, see Note, Notice
and Due Process in Federal Class Actions: A Requiem for Revised Rule 23?, 2 HAST.
CONST. L. Q. 479 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Requiem]; Note, Managing the Large
Class Action: Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 87 HARV. L. REV. 426 (1973); Note,
Manageability of Notice and Damage Calculation in Consumer Class Actions, 70
MICH. L. REV. 338 (1972). See also Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962).
177. This brings to light another shortcoming in the class action as
an effective remedy for consumer grievances. In many class actions, the
damage to the individual is minimal. . . .Under the Supreme Court's
holding in Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969), individual claims may
not be aggregated in order to satisfy the in-excess-of-$10,000
jurisdictional-amount requirement in federal-question and diversity-
jurisdiction cases. 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 1332. The effect of Snyder in the
antitrust field is not felt because under 28 U.S.C. § 1337, the
jurisdictional-amount requirement is waived in cases arising under the
antitrust laws. In actions in which the jurisdictional amount is required,
Snyder is a real problem and reduces the effectiveness of the class action
device.
Aloha, supra note 125, at 166. See also Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. at 266.
The jurisdictional amount requirement was tightened still further in Zahn v. Interna-
tional Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973), in which the Supreme Court held that the claim
of each member of the class must meet the dollar requirement. But see Supreme Tribe
of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921); Pinel v. Pinel, 240 U.S. 594 (1916).
178. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(3).
179. In Eisen, it was estimated that individual notification of the 2,000,000 "easily
ascertainable" class members would cost over $200,000, while the plaintiff himself had
only a $70 stake in the outcome. 417 U.S. at 175-77. See also Requiem, supra note 176,
at 490.
180. Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923); Georgia v. Tennessee
Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907).
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lus of efficiency and benefit to the wronged class outweighs the
possible harm to the interests of the nonrepresented parties in
the class action suit.'' As Judge (then Professor) Weinstein
wrote, class actions constitute an exception to two basic princi-
ples of procedural law:
[The first is that] each person is free to determine whether,
when and how to enforce his substantive rights; [the second is
that] each person is entitled to his day in court before his rights
are affected by a judgment. Powerful as they are, the abstract
objections to being bound by the actions of others yielded long
ago . . . to the practicalities of life and the law, to the need to
afford an effective remedy for the protection of rights and to the
reduction of repetitive litigation.
1 2
The second issue, that of the cost of notification and prose-
cution, is raised most acutely by Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin, 83 where the petitioner balked at bearing the cost of
notification,"' contending inter alia that
the prohibitively high cost of providing individual notice to
2,250,000 class members would end this suit. . . and effectively
frustrate petitioner's attempt to vindicate the policies underlying
the antitrust and securities laws.
8 5
The problem of financing such suits, stressed by Mr.
Eisen, tends to increase as the number of people involved in-
creases. 8 The class size in Eisen was ultimately determined to
be about 6 million worldwide; 17 the problems in financing a
class action on behalf of an entire country (especially a less
181. Rule 23 provides an "opt-out" clause, FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2). Recall also
that most members of a class have individually small or negligible claims.
182. Weinstein, Revision of Procedure: Some Problems in Class Actions, 9
BUFFALO L. REV. 433, 433-34 (1960).
183. 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
184. Id. at 175-76.
185. Id. at 156.
186. The more parties involved, the closer the class comes to fulfilling the parens
patriae criterion of "substantial number." Land O'Lakes Creameries v. Louisiana, 160
F. Supp. 387 (E. D. La. 1958). In addition, the closer the class comes to including the
entire state, the more the interest shifts from that of private individuals to that of the
public at large.
Significantly, New York, where Eisen arose, recently enacted a liberal class action
statute which rejects the federal requirement of mandatory individual notice to all
reasonably identifiable class members. N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW & RULES §§ 901-09
(McKinney Supp. 1975-76). The court may dispense with notice of pendency entirely,
or require only "reasonable notice ... in such manner as the court directs." Id. at §
904.
187. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 52 F.R.D. 253, 257-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
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prosperous country) are plain. Hence the state as parens
patriae ought to be competent to step in to vindicate the rights
of those who would otherwise be left without remedy. The more
obvious the inability of the present rule 23 class action suit to
meet certain acknowledged needs, the more essential it is for
the parens patriae to be recognized in appropriate cases as a
legitimate alternative strategy. 8'
But perhaps most importantly, the India suit points up a
vital but hitherto overlooked 8' aspect of class action suits-the
culture-bound nature of the notice requirements. 9 0 An Eisen-
188. This idea seems to underlie the recent ruling by the Fifth Circuit that, under
common law and Florida statutes and case law, the state attorney general has the
power to bring antitrust suits to recover for injuries sustained by administrative agen-
cies and other subdivisions of the state government, without obtaining their specific
authorization. Florida ex rel. Shevin v. Exxon Corp., 526 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1976). The
attorney general of a state would be here taking the role of parens patriae, since he is
not recovering on behalf of specific individuals, but exercising "all such authority as
the public interest requires." Id. at 268 (footnote omitted). The decision rendered into
law some of the major provisions of the Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, then
before Congress. The notion of the government as most able bearer of cost is all the
more apt for countries with low per capita private wealth, such as India. In 1914,
however, Congress rejected proposed legislation that would have enabled the attorney
general of any state to institute criminal proceedings under the antitrust laws in the
name of the United States. 51 CONG. REc. 14519, 14527 (1914).
All this is not to say, however, that there will be no large-scale cases falling
between the acceptability standards of a class action and a parens patriae suit. For
example, the United States could not assume the expenses of Mr. Eisen's suit as parens
patriae because only 6 million individuals (not all of them from the same country)
would be involved, nor would such pecuniary interest be likely to outweigh in compel-
ling importance the relatively small numbers involved. These would then qualify only
as private, particular interests. A stronger case for a parens patriae suit could be made
if 200 million Americans had a direct interest in the outcome. By the same token, if
the Eisen case had occurred in a country not much larger than 6 million (and observing
the same standards for parens patriae relief), a parens patriae suit could be brought
with the original class size. This suggests two observations: first, that a suit may
emerge as a class action or a parens patriae depending on the size of the country;
second, that some cases because of the size of the class involved may not meet either
class action or parens patriae requirements. However, parens patriae as a supplement
to class action guarantees that most cases of acute or widespread importance can in
fact be litigated.
For comment on the Exxon case, see 1976 So. ILL. U.L.J. 527. See also Burch v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 554 F.2d 633 (4th Cir. 1977), af'g 420 F. Supp. 82 (D.
Md. 1976) (state attorneys general have standing to seek injunctive relief under Clay-
ton Act § 16).
189. Necessarily, since India's is a case of first impression.
190. FED. R. CIv. P. Rule 23 (c)(2), (d). See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417
U.S. 156 (1974); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust, 339 U.S. 306 (1950). That
is, the notice requirement more naturally developed in countries where the quality of
living was generally high. Cf.,
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type class action, in which the petitioner was required to send
individual notice "to all class members whose names and ad-
dresses may be ascertained through reasonable effort,"'' is
meaningless in a country whose literacy rate is under 30 per-
cent. "'92 Moreover, even among the literate in India, access to
information is extremely limited: for every 1,000 inhabitants,
there are only 16 individual copies of any daily newspaper. 9 3
As for other means of communication, for every 100 Indians,
there are 0.3 telephones' and 2.3 radio receivers. 5 And, even
Pakistan's Prime Minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. . .advanced the general
thesis during a recent discussion of events here that "the political system
is the servant of the conditions," meaning that the democratic system
might not be able to coexist with extreme national poverty.
N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1976 at 10, col. 3. Thus the notice requirement and similar legal
practices may be peculiarly appropriate in highly industrialized, prosperous, and liter-
ate societies, like England or the United States, but unlike India, Iran, Vietnam, and
so forth. Consequently, the same rule of law promulgated in two different cultures may
achieve radically different results. See Seidman, The Communication of Law and the
Process of Development, 1972 Wisc. L. Rav. 686. Seidman's "Law of the Nontransfera-
bility of Law" states: "A rule that induces one sort of activity in a particular social,
political, and economic milieu will not induce the same activity in another social,
political, and economic milieu, save fortuitously." Id. at 697.
191. 417 U.S. at 173.
192. UNESCO, INTERNATIONAL YEARBOOK OF EDUCATION 190-91 (1967). As late as
1949, only 18% of India's total population of then over 500 million were literate. ALL-
INDIA EDUCATION YEAR BOOK 1 (1952). See also the latest UNESCO report on illiteracy,
which is on the increase around the world. N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1976, at 1, col. 1. See
generally E. FAURE Er AL., LEARNING TO BE: THE WORLD OF EDUCATION TODAY AND
ToMoRRow (1972).
193. UNITED NATIONS STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 1974, at 856 (UNESCO figures)
[hereinafter cited as U.N. YEARBOOK]. The corresponding figures for the United
States, Sweden, and Paraguay are, respectively, 297, 534, and 38. Id. at 857. A journal
is considered "daily" if it appears at least four times a week; the size of a newspaper
may range from one sheet to 50 or more pages. Id. at 858.
The abysmal state of communications in India is dramatically illustrated by a
recent report from that country's hinterlands, which begins:
Roop Narain Shanti, a sinewy bare-chested villager who earns 36
cents a day plus one meal by tilling other people's fields, was surprised
today to learn of the Government's suspension of civil liberties eight
months ago.
"All I know is that it is so hard to earn enough to live on," he said.
N.Y. Times, Mar. 3, 1976, at 2, col. 4.
194. U.N. YEARBOOK, supra note 193, at 535. Corresponding figures for the United
States, Israel, and England are, respectively, 65.7, 20.8, and 34. Id. at 535-36.
195. Id. at 865. Corresponding American figure: 175.2. Id. at 864. In 1973, there
were fewer than 0.1 television receivers per 1,000 Indians. Id. at 865. Furthermore, in
India's antitrust suit against the drug companies, those with the most at stake in the
outcome, the sickest and the poorest, are those least likely to be literate or have
sufficient access to information. See also Leibowitz, The Applicability of Federal Law
to Guam, 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 21 (1975), and authorities therein cited.
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if all could read and understand, consider the other countries
pressing suits, like Vietnam and Iran, that are not heirs of the
common law tradition; only experts in comparative law would
grasp the implications of a class action notification.
If a substantial number of people are denied necessary
resources, then, and a rule 23 class action is impossible because
of some of the considerations just mentioned, then it seems
that a parens patriae suit ought to be allowable' not only
because justice requires it but also because it is consonant with
expressly enunciated policies within our legal tradition.
Ironically, it was at the turn of the century, when Ameri-
can jingoistic fervor was at its height, that the Supreme Court
most clearly recognized the necessity of modifying constitu-
tional procedural requirements when prevailing cultural condi-
tions so dictated. In Downes v. Bidwell,' the Court upheld a
duty tax on a shipment of oranges from Puerto Rico to New
York on the theory that the newly acquired territory was not
exactly foreign soil, but nevertheless was not so integral a part
of the United States that the uniformity clause of the Constitu-
tion "'98 became applicable. Justice Brown, writing for the Court,
based this dual classification of American territory on the dif-
ference between "natural" or basic rights guaranteed to all
inhabitants of American territories, and "artificial" or instru-
Moreover, not even widespread literacy, if it is recently achieved, would make a
notice requirement truly workable. People newly come to literacy will not necessarily
appreciate all the possibilities and implications of literacy; they may not think imme-
diately of newspapers or radio as a regular reliable source as to their legal rights and
obligations. A tradition of literacy, as well as its bare acquisition, is needed for such a
skill to be exercised to its potential in all its various channels. See, e.g., J. TEaSEL,
THE MEDIA IN AMERICA (1974).
This argument of course holds equally with regard to the recent parens patriae
legislation, which contains notice requirements without provision for modification.
See, e.g., Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, tit. I, § 4C(b)(1); and PARENs PATRIAE
BILL, supra note 7, at 10. For discussions recognizing the culture-relative nature of
traditional readings of the American Constitution in alien settings, see Baralt, The
Origins of the Extension of the Constitution to the Territories Ex Proprio Vigore, 12
PHIL. L.J. 481 (1933); Note, El Derecho de Aviso: Due Process and Bilingual Notice,
83 YALE L.J. 385 (1973); McBride, The Application of the American Constitution to
American Samoa, 9 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 325 (1974).
196. See Velvel, supra note 153, at 31-33.
197. 182 U.S. 244 (1901).
198. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 provides:
The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts
and excises, . . . but all duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform
throughout the United States.
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mental rights, which were devised to safeguard basic rights,
but which may vary depending on the cultural community in-
volved.
It is obvious that in the annexation of outlying and distant
possessions grave questions will arise from differences of race,
habits, laws and customs of the people, and from differences of
soil, climate and production, which may require action on the
part of Congress that would be quite unnecessary in the annexa-
tion of contiguous territory inhabited only by people of the same
race, or by scattered bodies of native Indians.
We suggest, without intending to decide, that there may be
a distinction between certain natural rights, enforced in the Con-
stitution by prohibitions against interference with them, and
what may be termed artificial or remedial rights, which are pecu-
liar to our own system of jurisprudence. 9
India of course is not an annexed territory, but dominion is
irrelevant to the Court's main point, which is that alien cul-
tures and mores ought not to bar prosecution and recovery for
wrongs recognized as such under American law.
VI. THE QUESTION OF RECOVERY
Assuming a foreign government does sue as parens patriae
and is victorious, the next issue centers on the relative merits
of injunctive relief, financial awards in some amount, and in
some cases repayment in kind. That injunctive relief is obtain-
able by foreign sovereigns is fairly clear, both from precedent 2°°
and policy2°0 considerations. But an injunction is valuable to a
199. 182 U.S. at 282. See also De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901); Hawaii v.
Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, 217-18 (1903) (certain rights, including the right to an indict-
ment found by a grand jury, "are not fundamental in their nature, but concern merely
a method of procedure which sixty years of practice had shown to be suited to the
condition of the islands, and well calculated to conserve the rights of their citizens to
their lives, their property and their well-being." Id. at 218); Glidden Co. v. Zdanok,
370 U.S. 530, 544-47 (1962); Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652, 674 (1945);
Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312-13 (1922); Public Utility Comm'rs v. Ynchausti
& Co., 251 U.S. 401, 406-07 (1920); Ocampo v. United States, 234 U.S. 91, 98 (1914);
Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325, 332 (1911); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S.
138, 143, 147-49 (1904); In re Naturalization of 68 Filipino War Veterans, 406 F. Supp.
931, 940-41 (N.D. Cal. 1975). For early comment, see Langdell, The Status of Our New
Territories, 12 Hsav. L. REv. 365, 371 (1899); Littlefield, The Insular Cases, 15 Hsav.
L. REv. 169, 281 (1901); Thayer, The Insular Tariff Cases in the Supreme Court, 15
HAgv. L. RFv. 164 (1901); Thayer, Our New Possessions, 12 HAtv. L. REV. 464, 471,
473, 478-82 (1899).
200. Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439 (1945); accord People ex. rel.
Att'y Gen. v. Tool, 35 Colo. 225, 236-37, 86 P. 224, 227 (1905).
201. See text at note 77, supra.
VOL. 6:705
PARENS PATRIAE
plaintiff only if there is an ongoing violation; it is of little use
when the harm has been done. The relevant parens patriae
legislation 212 and cases203 have dealt solely with treble damages
as a monetary award. Treble damages, however, were insti-
tuted to provide incentive to private plaintiffs to share the cost
of enforcing the antitrust laws with the government .20 Foreign
governments, though often as not poorer than the United
States Government, nevertheless are not private plaintiffs205
202. Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, tit. III, § 4C (a)(2).
203. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251 (1972); Georgia v. Pennsylvania
R.R., 324 U.S. 439 (1945); Pfizer Inc. v. Lord, 522 F.2d 612 (8th Cir. 1975).
204. See Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. at 275-76; Georgia v. Evans, 316
U.S. 159 (1942); United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600 (1941). See also PARNS
PATRIAE BILL, supra note 7, at 13, 17ff. See generally Zenith Corp. v. Hazeltine, 395
U.S. 100, 130-31 (1969); Perma Mufflers v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139
(1968); Flintkote Co. v. Lysfjord, 246 F.2d 368, 398 & n.40 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355
U.S. 835 (1957); J. VAN CIsE, THE FEDERAL ANTrrusT LAws (3d rev. ed. 1975); MacIn-
tyre, The Role of the Private Litigant in Antitrust Enforcement, 7 ANTrrRUsT BULL.
113 (1962).
The remedy of actual damages for foreign sovereigns is of course only a recommen-
dation; under Clayton § 4 as currently enacted, only the United States government
may sue for single damages.
205. This is to make the state of India analogous to the state of Georgia in Georgia
v. Evans, 316 U.S. 159 (1942), and Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439 (1945).
Such parity of litigation status is precisely the effect intended by the relevant interna-
tional agreements. See, e.g., Treaty of Amity & Economic Relations with Iran, Aug.
15, 1955, [19571 8 U.S.T. 899, T.I.A.S. No. 3853, of which article 3, paragraph 2 reads
in pertinent part:
Nationals and companies of either High Contracting Party shall have
freedom of access to the courts of justice and administrative agencies
within the territories of the other High Contracting Party, in all degrees
of jurisdiction, both in defense and pursuit of their rights, to the end that
prompt and impartial justice be done. Such access shall be allowed in any
event, upon terms no less favorable than those applicable to nationals
and companies of such other High Contracting Party or of any third
country.
Quoted in Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 522 F.2d at 619 n.9. This provision guarantees to foreign
nationals access to American courts on the same terms as those available to United
States nationals, "practical difficulties notwithstanding." Id. at 619. The explicit un-
derstanding on the subject is important, for the broad principle of comity of nations
is relevant only when authoritative precedent suggests the appropriate ruling, but
more importantly it is not a principle which courts are specifically bound to apply.
Mast, Foos & Co. v. Stover Mfg. Co., 177 U.S. 485 (1900). "Comity is not a rule of
law, but one of practice, convenience and expediency. . . . Comity persuades; but it
does not command." Id. at 488. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895). But
see I. BROWNUE, PmNcns OF PuBuc INTERNATIONAL LAw 572 (2d ed. 1973); The Janko
(The Norsktank), 54 F. Supp. 241, 244 (E.D.N.Y. 1944). Two cases sometimes cited
for the proposition that a foreign country is entitled to sue as official representative
on behalf of its citizens both involved arguments based on explicit treaty provisions.
French Republic v. Saratoga Vichy Spring Co., 191 U.S. 427 (1903); United States v.
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when they sue as parens patriae, and should not require the
active encouragement of the United States to bring suits. Such
governments, after all, are acting at least theoretically out of
duty and should need no incentive other than the lower prices
which will result if they prevail. Respect, however, for the fin-
ancial burden faced by many foreign governments might sug-
gest that at least litigation fees should be recoverable2"' as well
as single damages.
Most discussions of damage recovery in a suit with the
scope of a parens patriae action have focussed on two aspects
of "general injury to the state's economy" (used, for example,
in Hawaii) as an actionable wrong: (1) such abstract injury is
not separable and distinct from individual wrongs to individual
citizens, hence prosecutions and relief would be duplicative2"7
and (2) even if such injury were separate and distinct, it is a
hopeless task to measure the damage in order to award accur-
ate compensation.0 8
Diekelman, 92 U.S. 520 (1875) (common law unfair competition and trade-name in-
fringement suits). See Foreign Government Antitrust Capacity, supra note 4, at 297
n.83; Velvel, supra note 153, at 25.
A provision relating to the rights of nationals in courts, similar to the one in the
treaty with Iran, is contained in article 2, paragraph 2, of the Treaty of Amity &
Economic Relations with Viet-Nam, April 3, 1961, 12 U.S.T. 1703, T.I.A.S. No. 4890.
The United States does not have a treaty of amity and economic relations with either
India or the Philippines, and a similar provision is apparently lacking in other treaties
with these countries.
206. But see United States v. Cooper Corp.: "[Tihe concluding words of J§ 7 of
the Sherman Act] give the injured party, as part of his costs, a reasonable attorney's
fee,-[sic] a provision more appropriate for a private litigant than for the United
States." 312 U.S. at 606. However, the Supreme Court did not at this time contemplate
antitrust suits by foreign sovereigns. See note 161, supra. When Chisholm was decided,
it was feared by many state governments that their revenues would be depleted solely
through litigation expenses. See text at note 105; C. WARREN, 1 THE SUPREME COURT
IN U.S. HIsTORy 99 (1922).
207. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. at 265; Handler, Antitrust-Myth and
Reality, Senate Hearings on S. 1284, at 640, reprinted in 50 N.Y.U.L. REV. 211 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Handler, page citations to Hearings].
208. See Note, Damage Distribution in Class Actions: The Cy Pres Remedy, 39
U. Cm. L. REv. 448 (1972); cf.:
One need only ponder the myriad causes contributing to our current
economic plight to imagine the futility of singling out and measuring in
dollars the damage to a state's "general economy" purportedly attributa-
ble to an antitrust infraction. If, after years of study, eminent economists
cannot agree on whether or to what extent concentration contributes to
spiraling prices, how can we expect our courts, already strapped for time
and limited in resources, to make the kind of judgments that this bill
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The first criticism ignores the fact that parens patriae is a
suit of last resort, to be used when other modes of litigation
have been found impermissible or impractical.2"9 The parens
patriae suit will be the only approach possible in such a situa-
tion, since the sovereign will be the only party with capacity
and standing to bring the suit. As for the possibility of duplica-
tive recovery, an appropriate statute of limitations could be
instituted. As Professor Posner sensibly suggests:
Why not make the measure of recovery in such an action simply
the sum of all of the overcharges paid by the residents of the state
as a result of the violation, and provide that the bringing of the
action is a bar to any separate actions by residents of the state
growing out of the same violation?1 0
The second criticism, concerning the difficulty of measure-
ment, overlooks the fact that other areas of the law have for a
long time awarded monetary relief for such unmanageable or
unquantifiable injuries as pain and suffering, wrongful death,
and loss of consortium.2"' The Supreme Court has held, in
Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, 12 that uncertainty as to the
contemplates? Where proof of injury is so attenuated that any eviden-
tiary effort is doomed to failure, there is no reason, in my mind, why the
assertion of the claim should be permitted at all.
Handler, supra note 207, at 641. See also Handler & Blechman, supra note 6, at 638-
49. See generally Comment, Due Process and Fluid Class Recovery, 53 ORE. L. REv.
225 (1974).
209. The practical effect of Eisen is to eliminate the Rule 23 class
action as a feasible means for recovery by a large class of individuals each
of whom has sustained relatively minor damages. In situations where the
costs of giving notice to the class are much greater than any individual
class member's stake in the outcome of the action, it is unlikely that any
suit will be brought. The person who deals in certain types of consumer
goods, where each transaction may involve only a few dollars, can now
fix prices, relatively free from the fear of substantial treble damage ac-
tions.
House Report, quoted in PARENs PATRIAE BILL, supra note 7, at 10.
210. R. POSNER, ANTITRUST: CASES, ECONoMIc NOTES, AND OTHER MATERIALS 159
(1974). Posner's suggestion was taken up in the Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976,
tit. III, § 4C (a)(1)(A).
211. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 880, 327-35, 905 (4th ed. 1971).
Juries, being gifted with the power to put a dollar value on a person's
reputation, or his eyesight, or his wife's affections, or even his life itself,
should have little trouble with so relatively simple a proposition as mea-
suring in dollars the amount of injury a monopolist . . . or a conspirator
has inflicted upon his victim's business or property.
Rowley, Proof of Damages in Antitrust Cases, 32 A.B.A. ANTITRUST L.J. 75, 75 (1966).
212. 327 U.S. 251 (1946).
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exact amount of damages should not preclude recovery; the
wrongdoer is to bear the risk of the uncertainty, provided the
jury can make a reasonable estimate based on reliable and
adequate data.2 13 The criticism has even less point in a transna-
tional context, where, in fairness, perhaps it was never meant
to apply. For where, as in the antibiotics litigation, the amount
of overcharge is known through domestic investigation, the
domestic operation serves as a "control" against which to mea-
sure the exorbitance of prices set abroad. Thus the difficulties
attendant upon proving the pass-on of an overcharge, as de-
scribed in the leading case of Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United
States Shoe Machinery Corp., 21  disappear in cases like the
foreign governments' drug suits.
213. Id. at 262-66. Cf. Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Co., 282 U.S. 555 (1931);
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Co., 273 U.S. 359 (1927).
In each case we held that the evidence sustained verdicts for the
plaintiffs, and that in the absence of more precise proof, the jury could
conclude as a matter of just and reasonable inference from the proof of
defendants' wrongful acts and their tendency to injure plaintiffs' busi-
ness, and from the evidence of the decline in prices, profits and values,
not shown to be attributable to other causes, that defendants' wrongful
acts had caused damage to the plaintiffs.
327 U.S. at 264.
See Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 260-63 (5th Cir. 1974);
Shapiro, Processing the Consumer's Claim, 41 A.B.A. ANTITRuST L.J. 257, 270-73
(1972); Alpine Pharmacy, Inc. v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 1973-1 Trade Cas. 74,593 (2d
Cir. 1973) (formula used to distribute settlement fund).
214. 392 U.S. 481 (1968). See Handler & Blechman, supra note 6, at 638-39; note
160 supra. Moreover, despite the argument that foreign operations or subsidiaries of
American businesses are largely autonomous and should therefore be immune from
American antitrust laws, the courts have been liberal in extending the reach of the
antitrust statutes. In United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 20 F. Supp. 13
(S.D.N.Y. 1937), a Canadian holding corporation was found to be within American
jurisdiction under Clayton Act § 12, which provides that process in an antitrust case
may be served in the district in which the corporation is an inhabitant or wherever it
may be found. The Canadian corporation maintained large offices in New York and
was "actively and continuously engaged in transacting business for which it was incor-
porated through its principal executive officers and a permanent organization." Id. at
19. In United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, 133 F. Supp.
40 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), a Swiss watch cartel composed entirely of foreign companies
operating in a foreign country under the terms of an agreement negotiated in Switzer-
land was held to have been "continuously present" and thus "found" in the United
States under Clayton Act § 12. through the activities of an American advertising
agency which had undertaken an advertising campaign for the cartel and its New York
information center, though the information center engaged in no business of its own.
See generally Kaiser, Conflict of Laws and the Extraterritorial Effect of Commercial
Regulation, 1 QuEm's L.J. 384, 393-94 (1972); Rahl, American Antitrust and Foreign
Operations: What is Covered?, 8 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1 (1974).
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Actual damages plus fees, then, would seem to be the ap-
propriate award. Some sort of fluid recovery system could also
be instituted, for the most equitable remedy in India's case
would involve distribution of the gross damages to the class as
a whole.21 Damages in kind (additional antibiotics) or propor-
tionately reduced prices on future drug shipments appear the
most logical alternatives. Obviously Congress can change the
scope and procedure of the parens patriae suit; but the present
analysis and recommendations are based on existing acknowl-
edged legal doctrine, the doctrine which would be applicable
to the remnants of the Pfizer litigation. It is to be hoped that
any changes made in the parens patriae suit would not dimin-
ish its usefulness but in keeping with both deep-rooted princi-
ples and enlightened policy, on the contrary, enhance it.
VII. CONCLUSION
Next Term the Supreme Court will decide the question of
whether a foreign country is a "person" under section 4 of the
Clayton Act. An appropriate line of reasoning, in light of the
foregoing analysis of the issues involved, would be as follows:
(1) The relevant provisions in treaties with foreign nations-
Iran and South Vietnam," ' among the named plaintiffs-give
foreign nationals the same rights under American law when
suing in United States courts as American nationals have.2'7
Capacity to sue is, thus, granted by treaty and safeguarded by
the parens patriae suit.
2 1"
215. Comment, Due Process and Fluid Class Recovery, 53 ORE. L. REv. 225, 227
(1974). But see Blechman, Class Actions-A Reappraisal in Light of Hawaii v. Stan-
dard Oil, 38 J. AIR L. & COM. 389 (1972).
216. See note 205 supra. Since Vietnam's suit has been dismissed, note 5 supra,
Iran is the only one of the named plaintiffs to have capacity under present treaty
arrangements.
217. See note 205 supra.
218. See note 41 supra. Whether a foreign nation can ever raise a § 4 claim at all
(i.e., is a "person" under that section) is a question of capacity; whether the particular
injury alleged is protected by § 4 is a question of standing. The Supreme Court recog-
nized this distinction in Hawaii when it stated: "The question in this case is not
whether Hawaii may maintain its lawsuit on behalf of its citizens, but rather whether
the injury for which it seeks to recover is compensable under § 4 of the Clayton Act."
405 U.S. at 259.
Acknowledging, moreover, that matters of foreign capacity are determined by
treaty and diplomatic agreement, while questions of standing are decided by domestic
case law and statutory enactment, restores the proper allocation of functions under the
separation of powers doctrine. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829);
accord, Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 518 (1969); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,
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(2) A foreign state is analogous either to a national state (the
United States federal government) or to a subnational state, e.g.,
Hawaii. The latter alternative is the more likely, since the dis-
tinction between the two types of state for purposes of antitrust
legislation turns on the federal government's uniquely-given
sanctions to enforce the antitrust laws.219
(3) In either case, there is ample authority for holding both the
federal government and subnational states as "persons" under
the Clayton Act. The United States was expressly declared a
"person" under Clayton § 4 by statute in 1955,220 and "Hawaii
plainly qualifies as a person under both sections [4 and 161 of
the statute [Clayton Act].
22 1
Even though Iran thus has capacity under Clayton § 4, such a
plaintiff must still clear the standing hurdle, a feat made more
difficult by recent decisions such as Illinois Brick2 2 and
Pennsylvania v. New Jersey;2 1 only then can the actual merits
of the case be litigated. It is nevertheless important to realize
that once capacity has been granted with one hand, it should
not be taken away with the other by refusing to allow a plaintiff
to contest an alleged injury in at least one of the traditionally
accepted standing postures-proprietary claim, class action,
or parens patriae. One injunction is as good as 100,224 but only
if that one injunction is available.
The parens patriae suit is a viable and valuable alternative
to the class action as a means of vindicating consumer rights
on a large scale, especially in the international arena. Tradi-
tional due process objections are irrelevant to countries without
a common law jurisprudence or without the resources to make
the conventional wisdom of American constitutional law mean-
ingful. A perceptive and flexible approach to antitrust suits by
foreign governments suggests that serious reconsideration be
given to the parens patriae suit as an effective strategy.
217 (1962) (political questions not justiciable primarily because of separation of pow-
ers).
219. See text accompanying notes 151-52 supra.
220. See note 158 supra.
221. 405 U.S. at 261.
222. See note 7 supra.
223. 426 U.S. 660 (1976) (Pennsylvania's motion to file suit as parens patriae on
behalf of its citizens against allegedly unfair tax burden imposed by New Jersey on
nonresidents' New Jersey-derived income, denied).
For a review of recent trends in standing requirements in antitrust cases, see
Sherman, Antitrust Standing: From Loeb to Malamud, 51 N.Y.U.L. REv. 374 (1976);
Berger & Bernstein, An Analytical Framework for Antitrust Standing, 86 YALE L.J. 809
(1977).
224. See note 142 supra.
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